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ABSTRACT 
As we find in Empire and Multitude, Antonio Negri's political project IS a 
thoroughly Marxist analysis and critique of global or late capitalism. By modifying and 
updating Marx's conceptual tools, he is able to provide a clear account of capitalism's 
processes, its expanding reach, and the revolutionary potential that functions as its motor. 
By turning to Negri's philosophical works, however, we find that this political 
analysis is founded on a series of concepts and theoretical positions. This paper attempts 
to clarify this theoretical foundation, highlighting in particular what I term "ontological 
constructivism" - Negri's radical reworking of traditional ontology. Opposing the long 
history of transcendence in epistemology and metaphysics (one that stretches from Plato 
to Kant), this reworked ontological perspective positions individuals - not god or some 
other transcendent source - as the primary agents responsible for molding the ontological 
landscape. 
Combined with his understanding of kairos (subjective, immeasurable time), 
ontological constructivism lays the groundwork for opposing transcendence and 
rethinking contemporary politics. 
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INRODUCTION: THE INTERSECTION OF ONTOLOGY AND PRAXIS 
Far from demanding an end to critical dialogue and discourse, the various 
political and social crises of the twenty-first century instead necessitate a return to the 
open theoretical discussions that were ubiquitous during the sixties and seventies. At the 
same time, a reexamination of the various conceptual paradigms that were previously 
deemed bankrupt or unnecessary is certainly a task that warrants attention and scrutiny. 
Interestingly, the demand for this return and reexamination is founded on a widespread 
paradox - that is, the simultaneous existence of two antagonistic phenomena: first, the 
reemergence of a geopolitical landscape defmed by imperialism and war, and, second, the 
tendency, in North America at least, for passivism and indifference. Whereas political 
turmoil once acted as a motor for critique and analysis, a demand for "the radical 
transformation of the status quo,"! we now fmd it coupled with a pervasive social 
disinterest. Paolo Vimo labeled the foundational modes of being that generate this 
paradox the "sentiments of disenchantment," and suggested that they - that is, 
"Opportunism, fear, and cynicism," - have begun to "enter into production, or rather, 
they intertwine with the versatility and flexibility of electronic technologies.,,2 If this is 
true, if disenchantment is a cancer in the heart of production and constitution, then the 
aforementioned call for a return to open discourse is all the more pressing. 
Similarly, if Vimo's version of disenchantment has infected even the most basic 
modes of being, the primordial levels of experience and understanding that defme our 
very existence, it will be necessary for our inquiries to start at a fundamental level - it 
will be necessary, in other words, to begin any political project with an ontological 
analysis. Luckily, any student interested in following this path will find invaluable 
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guide-posts in the works of Antonio Negri. His works surely illustrate the necessity for 
returning critical thought to its former status. In various ways, they also strip away the 
crippling misunderstandings that have turned words like 'Marxism' and 'communism' 
into political blasphemies. More important, though, is their emphasis on what Michael 
Hardt refers to as the "ontologically constitutive nature of practice.,,3 According to this 
concept, individual and collective action (I will use the term 'praxis' to highlight its 
political, constructive dimensions) is situated at the starting-point of being. The world, in 
other words, does not present a system of predetermined ontological patterns and 
categories, nor is it an ongoing product defined and constructed by a transcendent source. 
Conversely, being - the ontological fabric of existence - is generated and woven by the 
force of praxis. Whether it is by purely conceptual means, by, for example, the formation 
of new ideological perspectives, or by a tangible force in the material world - protesting, 
for instance - this form of praxis carves and inscribes unique patterns on the plane of 
existence, essentially constructing new forms and assemblages of being. For Negri, then, 
the term 'ontology' is less a branch of metaphysics designed to categorize objects and 
their varying degrees of reality; instead, it is a category that signifies the lack of hierarchy 
in the world around us and, simultaneously, the productive process whereby this reality is 
generated. A scientific analogue for this process is the manner in which super-massive 
objects create dimples and tears in the fabric of space-time, indentations that result in 
gravitational "force.,,4 In much the same way, praxis molds and reworks the fabric of 
reality, resulting in new arrangements and combinations. Although Negri never uses the 
term himself, it will be helpful to refer to this radical development as 'ontological 
constructivism.' 'Constructivism' may be a loaded term, especially in the philosophical 
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register, but it can be used here to simply signify the constitutive power of praxis, the 
manner in which human action constructs our physical and mental realities. 
This particular union, the fusion of ontology and praxis, defines in large part the 
inventiveness of Negri's approach. As we will come to see, Negri's ontological 
constructivism posits praxis as the engine of the production of being. The importance of 
this concept is emphasized by Hardt and Negri in their collaborative works. In Empire, 
for instance, the authors map the similarities between their concept of constitutive action 
and a similar process in the works of Deleuze and Guattari: "Machines produce. The 
constant functioning of social machines in their various apparatuses and assemblages 
produces the world along with the subjects and objects that constitute it.,,5 
The importance of ontological constructivism, even as defined so far in 
straightforward, embryonic form, needs only to be noted and remembered. The concept 
will act as an anchor and guide-post as we continue to analyze Negri's contribution to 
ontology, contrasting it with the prevalent, transcendent tradition and comparing it with 
other contemporary continental developments in the field. Further, the concept will 
provide the framework within which the idea of temporal constitution, or kairos, can be 
explored. Overall, this form of constructivism (in both its general and temporal forms) 
provides the foundation for a possible or potential politics free from the overarching 
hierarchy and teleology of global capitalism. With this core concept, Negri has 
essentially constructed a philosophical basis for the development of a new form of social 
organization, a society wherein community, interaction, and innovation are defining 
characteristics that emerge from the "bottom" as opposed to the "top" (although this 
distinction becomes superfluous in a classless society). In other words, the formation of 
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social relations is governed by everyone, by the multitude of civilization, as opposed to 
being imposed by an abstract logic or governing rule. It is my contention that Negri is 
really the first political theorist to articulate the necessary conditions for this social 
transformation and the first philosopher to provide an ontological perspective that aids 
our practical pursuits against the extreme absurdities of the capitalist mode of production. 
Conceptually, Negri's form of ontological creation is closely linked with a 
number of important ideas: Negri's interpretation of Marxian real subsumption; the 
concept of self-valorization; and territorialization in the Deleuzian context. As we 
gradually map these various ideas into a general picture of political protest and revolt 
against capitalist accumulation, it will be fitting to conclude with some remarks 
concerning the transition from philosophy to politics, from theoretical speculation to 
practical realization. 
Negri's project is thoroughly and unquestioningly political in nature. Even his 
most philosophical work is really an attempt to provide us with the conceptual 
ammunition to effectively revolt against the ubiquitous injustices and absurdities that are 
a staple of our global political and economic landscape. With this in mind, tracing a 
movement from concept to act, descending not as Marx did into the "hidden abode of 
production" per se, but rather into the various nebulas and constellations of political 
protest and rebellion, will prove that Negri's thinking provides the fundamental tools 
necessary for fighting inequality and exploitation. 
At the same time, it will gradually become clear that this "descent" is in actuality 
a horizontal movement. For Negri, turning philosophic thought into political action is not 
a matter of transitioning from the light of pure reason to the empirical world of 
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expenence. On the contrary, his thoroughly materialist ontology effectively shows that 
these acts are tantamount - philosophy is political and politics is philosophical. Once 
transcendent thinking, the spectre of Enlightenment rationalism, is abandoned, moving 
from one to the other is more like swimming across an immeasurable, unbounded body of 
water. 
TRANSCENDENCE IN EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS 
Before we begin concretizing the specific aspects of Negri's ontological 
approach, a brief detour regarding an opposing development in the metaphysical tradition 
is understandably crucial. We can tum to Empire for a starting point. Hardt and Negri 
argue that modem rationalism reaffirmed an ancient form of dualistic thinking by 
insisting on the existence of a form of mediation that essentially separates individuals 
from either a) the objects of experience, andlor b) God. As they put it: 
.. .in every case mediation had to be imposed on the complexity of human 
relations. Philosophers disputed where this mediation was situated and what 
metaphysical level it occupied, but it was fundamental that in some way it be 
defined as the ineluctable condition of all human action, art, and association. 
And later: "What is at play is a form of mediation, or really a reflexive folding back and a 
sort of weak transcendence, which relativizes experience and abolishes every instance of 
the immediate and absolute in human life and history.,,6 According to this view, various 
Enlightenment philosophers found it necessary to insist on the need for mediating 
structures that are essential if the subjective agent is going to have any chance of 
understanding the outside world. In terms of epistemology, Kant is the focus of this 
critique. 
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The epistemological mechanisms Kant describes in the first Critique are a bridge 
between the subjective world of the transcendental subject and the objective world of 
noumena. Although the latter are never truly known, the phenomena the subject 
experiences directly are, as Kant clearly states, caused by things-in-themselves and 
therefore intricately connected to them (although we have no idea what form this 
connection takes). 
By extension, it is clear that Hegel carries on the tradition of what we can call 
'epistemic mediation' in his own work.7 Here, rather than turning to imbedded mental 
structures for a filter of a posteriori data, he finds this mechanism in the form of socio-
cultural norms and parameters. Joseph C. Flay deals with this topic extensively in "Time 
in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. " He states: 
Whatever we know, and however we know it, we know enframed within a 
Zeitgeist. Put in another way, what gives form to how we 'receive' and 
understand what we know is not pure 'Anschauung,' but a 'Weltanschauung' or 
Zeitgeist full of content. This is what truly forms the 'between' or Zwischen of 
our relation to the world.8 
For Hegel, then, the knower, unable to understand the world in terms of a constant flow 
of particularized data, an uncertain, persistent, unintelligible wave of information, can 
only schematize this data into compartments and hierarchies arranged in coordination 
with the predominating Zeitgeist. This is the only way for the Hegelian subject to make 
sense of the world. 
Flay's statements can certainly take us this far, but a fuller account of Hegel's 
epistemology is more elusive. The cryptic nature of the Phenomenology is largely to 
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blame for this; still, it is nonetheless entirely possible to excavate a comprehensive 
epistemological doctrine from the complexities of the text. According to Robert C. 
Solomon, for example, Hegel provides an inroad into his epistemology with the 
presentation of three central developments of Consciousness: "Sense-Certainty," 
"Perception," and "Understanding." At a superficial level, Hegel is paraphrasing the 
various doctrines of his predecessors and contemporaries with the aim of exposing their 
inconsistencies and error, using the title "Sense-Certainty" to denote the concept of a 
"bare particular" that precedes the more complex act of conceptualization. Hegel finds 
this notion problematic. "Perception" is for Hegel the theory of knowledge determined to 
prove that the objects of experience are presented to us as assemblages of properties - all 
that we experience are the properties and never the objects themselves. Again, Hegel is 
unconvinced. Lastly, "Understanding" introduces the concept of an intangible "force" 
that exists as the metaphysical background to which properties are attached. 
Hegel of course criticizes these positions for various reasons, but the content of 
Hegel's own doctrine is, according to Solomon, not to be found in the criticism of these 
standpoints, but instead in his subsequent reaffIrmation of their validity. On Solomon's 
interpretation, Hegel understands these positions as sets of cognitive parameters that 
condition and determine our understanding of the world. In other words, the presentation 
and construction of these philosophical positions are acts of "self-confirmation": 
" ... knowing and philosophizing about knowing are self-confirming activities.,,9 To 
philosophize, then, is to construct a set of epistemological rules or categories that 
individuals utilize in their attempt to understand the chaos of experience. These "forms 
of consciousness," although varied and mostly irreconcilable, are nonetheless perfectly 
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valid methods for understanding the unschematized world of empirical data: "The 
('absolute') truth is that there are alternative and equally valid if not equally adequate 
'one-sided' ways of looking at the world of human experience: the basic concepts of our 
understanding are determined in these various theoretical stances."l0 
What Hegel has presented is in fact quite revolutionary - the existence of a form 
of epistemological (as opposed to ontological) constructivism, where the construction of 
epistemological doctrines determines the nature of epistemology itself. He has presented 
a world of diverse cognitive schemata that cannot be reduced to a single set of Kantian 
categories. For Hegel, there is no irreducible set of absolutely necessary categories, for 
they can easily be replaced if an opposing system of thought proves its worth and 
validity. If Solomon is implying that these various epistemologies form a central 
component of the Zeitgeist, then his interpretation runs parallel to Flay's abovementioned 
statements concerning Hegel and knowledge. If they do not, Solomon and Flay are at 
odds concerning their interpretations. It seems, however, that the former is the case: 
Solomon's understanding of mutually valid cognitive parameters exists as a subset of 
Flay's Zeitgeist theory. Epistemological doctrines and their categories form a part of the 
overall cultural field that operates as the mediating factor between the subject and the 
world, the filter that is used to coordinate a posteriori data into comprehensible 
assemblages and arrangements. This revolutionary model of knowledge will be 
reexamined later (for it presents, astonishingly, certain similarities with Negri's own 
views). For now, we can see that the statements made in Empire are indeed valid -
Hegel's epistemology, as innovative as it is, explicitly depends on a mediating factor. 
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While we can see that Hegel's version of epistemic mediation is different in form 
from the Kantian variant, their reliance on a structural filter or framework, one that 
bridges the gap between knower and known, subject and object, is for Negri and Hardt 
representative of a predominant trend in modem philosophical thought. Despite the fact 
that both Kant and Hegel contribute to the humanist proj ect of granting unique 
metaphysical value to the individual, attempting to " ... pose the subject at the center of 
the metaphysical horizon ... ,,11 their persistent devotion to what the authors call a 
'transcendental apparatus,12 drives a noxious wedge into the consistency of being, 
producing a rupture or tear in what will come to be known as the "flatness" of the 
ontological landscape. Their superimposition of epistemological filters onto the 
subject/object relationship strips the relation of its immediacy; the external object, as a 
result, retains none of the tangibility and closeness necessary for an understanding of 
being free from hierarchy and teleology. At the same time, this form of mediation is an 
instance of a larger movement and tendency in modem philosophy. 
Transcendent logic can also be characterized by a form of mediation that 
separates the individual from God, the Absolute, Spirit, or any similar version of the 
concept. Just as Kant and Hegel utilize epistemological structures transcendent in nature, 
we will find that philosophical modernity is replete with instances of metaphysical 
structures that offer us more obvious examples of transcendence. The Savage Anomaly, 
Negri's pioneering interpretation of Spinoza, is a central work that will aid us in many 
respects. For now, it can serve as an inroad into the concept of metaphysical 
transcendence. In a section detailing Spinoza's removal of the oppositional relationship 
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between one and many, unity and plurality, Negri explains that this abolition is an 
anomaly: 
The anomaly lies in the radically antifinalistic perspective of Spinozian 
philosophy; by finalism I mean (as does Spinoza) every metaphysical 
configuration that superimposes on the initiative of the multiplicity a 
transcendental synthesis.13 
Finalism, in other words, is the tendency to impose a transcendent schematic over the 
heterogeneity of the material world. Beginning with the pre-Socratics, the nature of the 
relationship between unity and plurality has been perennial, and the varied attempts since 
this time to explain their coexistence and reciprocity have almost always taken the form 
of Negri's finalism. It will help, however, to briefly examine the first truly philosophical, 
rather than cosmological, articulation of this form of transcendent metaphysics, and 
although we are now drifting away from an analysis of modem thought, Plato's system 
can rightfully be interpreted as the historical foundation of this trend. 
Plato was really the first to superimpose a rigid, prefigured metaphysical structure 
over the Heraclitian flux of the material world. In an attempt to synthesis Heraclitus' 
views with the Parmenidean doctrine of a unified and unchanging reality, he proposed the 
existence of a realm of universal Ideas. We gain access to this realm not through sense 
perception, not through the pursuit of empirical investigation and natural science, but 
through philosophic contemplation and a priori mathematics. Nonetheless, the 
intricacies of his doctrine need not be examined here. What is presently of interest is the 
resultant ontological dualism (or quasi-dualism) Plato set in motion. In order to make 
sense of this world, the world of human interaction, of politics and science, we must 
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understand it through the lens or optic of Platonic Forms. The gram of sand is 
unintelligible as an empirical entity. It gains lucidity, however, once we understand it as 
a substandard reproduction of the Idea that prefigures it, a simulacrum of a truer and 
nobler reality. 
The most obvious counterpoint is that Plato did not really divide the universe into 
two separate, distinct ontological categories. He simply implied that there are different 
versions of the same reality, with corresponding ontological grades of being. This 
argument is certainly valid, and can be supported by his various references to the fact that 
the world of particulars, the natural world of the senses, is a kind of shadow of the 
ultimate reality of Ideas. This concept appears repeatedly throughout Plato's work, but 
nowhere is it provided with more lucidity and metaphorical brilliance than in the 
"Allegory of the Cave." Here, a group of prisoners are subjected to a puppet-show 
involving shadows cast on their cave wall. This is their reality, and their science involves 
the meticulous and analytic study of these ephemeral shadows, the classification of their 
forms and theories concerning their origins. Nonetheless, it becomes clear that, however 
futile their efforts, they are not trapped in a completely different reality, one sectioned off 
and segregated entirely from the Good. Shadows are a necessary part of the world, even 
if they are degraded replicas of some higher level of being. 
The analogy is clear: the natural world of sense-perception is a shadow of a higher 
ontological plateau. When science deals with these shadows, it deals with particular 
objects of a lower ontological status, but there is an inextricable connection between 
Form and particular, and it would be erroneous to state that they exist in wholly 
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segregated realms. Thus, applying the term 'ontological dualism' to Plato's metaphysical 
system could be misleading. 
This may be true, but it hardly saves Plato from Negri's application of the term 
'finalism. ,14 The end result of his quasi -dualism is still a devaluation of the material 
world. Even if he has connected his metaphysical framework to the world around us, the 
system itself still takes philosophical priority over the fleeting, multifarious shadows of 
sense, and this is exactly the form of transcendent metaphysics Spinoza and Negri are 
combating. 
In The Savage Anomaly, Negri finds that Spinoza was instead able to discern the 
existence of only one level of being, the level associated with the material world of 
things. Any supposed higher realm of being is associated with a vague immateriality or 
transcendence. Here, then, the placement of ontological value is reversed. It is with the 
material world that one finds ontological primacy (indeed, one fmds the only ontology). 
The world of sense-objects constitutes the very fabric of being, the raw material from 
which we may form and constitute various arrangements of resistance and opposition. 
Spinoza associates this ontological primacy with a form of power called potentia - the 
metaphysical foundation from which constellations of freely-created political and social 
action are founded. Any attempt to devalue this basis is associated with a form of Power, 
potestas, and can be considered illusory and transient. Any system that attempts to 
superimpose its ideals and parameters over the teeming flux of humanity and the material 
world is arbitrary and superficial. Even more, Plato's world of transcendent Ideas is not 
merely devalued but negated - for Spinoza it does not exist. 
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As we can see, this "inversion of the metaphysical perspective" is a kind of 
materialistic reverse-Platonism where the metaphysical tradition of finalism is upended 
and reconfigured. IS At the same time, Negri's analysis of Spinozian thought has already 
bridged the aforementioned gap between theory and practice. The danger of transcendent 
thinking is that is lends itself to a form of Power - potestas - that relies on hierarchical 
structures. Platonic metaphysics, when transposed onto the political landscape, advocates 
the kind of top-down power structures prevalent in contemporary politics. Like Plato's 
system, these structures devalue the everyday world of sense, the world of human 
interaction and politics, and trumpet their own artificiality and abstractness. Likewise, 
the aforementioned forms of Kantian and Hegelian epistemic mediation place artificial 
barriers between the individual and his surroundings, rendering the latter either 
unknowable (in the Kantian context) or distant and relative (in the Hegelian context). 
The result is that the world around us loses its immediacy and immanence, its rightful 
status as the ontological foundation from which all constructive acts of creation arise. 
Considering the fact that Negri's primary project is to unify the ontological 
tradition with the political concept of praxis, it is obvious why the various products of the 
transcendent tradition are oppositional and antagonistic. In the epistemological context, 
they are responsible for artificially separating the subject from the world of experience, 
creating an epistemic barrier that simultaneously renders action and production in the 
"world of things" a distant, elusive reality. In the metaphysical context, the tradition is 
responsible for producing a rupture or tear between different or even opposing 
ontological landscapes. This rupture may not take the form of a true dualism, instead 
presenting a kind of ontological hierarchy (as we see with Plato), but the problem still 
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exists: materiality loses its rightful status as the true source of construction. This much is 
clear, but for a fuller account of the problem and a better explanation of the nuances of 
Negri's approach, we can tum again to Hegel. While the brief analysis of Plato provided 
a clear and effective account of a "transcendental apparatus," in retrospect we can see 
that he is an easy target. 
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1. HEGEL AND NEGATIVE ONTOLOGY 
The finalism inherent in Platonic metaphysics provides an entry-point into the 
discussion and critique of the predominant tradition of transcendence. It is important to 
note, however, that Platonism is by no means the true enemy of Negri's constitutive 
ontology. A more substantial and complex account of ontological constructivism is 
instead greatly facilitated by contrasting the details of Negri's approach with the 
overarching teleology of the Hegelian dialectic. 
Hegel has certainly come to represent a strain of philosophy intricately connected 
to forms of political and ideological fascism. Whether this representation is justified or 
not is a complicated question deserving lengthy, independent analysis. As we continue 
forward, it will suffice to detail the manner in which Hegel provides, much like Plato, the 
ontological foundations for a possible or potential fascism. This potentiality is unique in 
that it is founded not on a single metaphysical system (as we find in Plato), but instead on 
an overarching, all-inclusive meta-theory or meta-philosophy - the dialectic. 
Before we proceed in this direction, however, it is necessary to abandon our 
purely philosophical analysis to explain what many consider to be Negri's most 
significant contribution to political philosophy: the concept of Empire. According to the 
authors of Empire: 
... we have witnessed an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic 
and cultural exchanges. Along with the global market and global circuits of 
production have emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule - in 
short, a new form of sovereignty. Empire is the political subject that effectively 
regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world.16 
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Empire, then, is the dominant, hegemonic political organism that operates on a global 
level. It is a system of authoritative control that cannot be characterized by any single 
element of its constitution. It cannot, for example, be defined by imperialism or 
globalization alone. It does, on the other hand, contain a number of organizations or 
political components that, when taken together, represent a kind of multi-tiered, 
heterogeneous form of order that lacks the quality of centralization so frequently found in 
previous models of political authority. As we are told in Empire, its constitution is 
"pyramidal" and can be best described by detailing each level or tier of the structure. 
At the uppermost level, the apex of the pyramid, global power is represented by 
the United States. Just below this superpower but still within the same tier, we find other 
powerful and influential nation-states that are bonded together by various affiliations. 
These nation-states operate alongside a group of transnational economic institutions - the 
International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and World Bank - and can be 
considered to be one of the primary means by which global capital is controlled and 
directed. I7 According to Matteo Mandarini, this tier is analogues to the ancient system of 
monarchy that, along with aristocracy and democracy, comprise the model of mixed 
constitution that Polybius utilizes in his analysis of the Roman Empire. Is The second tier 
of Empire's pyramidal structure correlates to aristocracy and can be described as, simply, 
transnational capital: "This tier is structured primarily by the networks that transnational 
capitalist corporations have extended throughout the world market - networks of capital 
flows, technology flows, population flows, and the like.,,19 Along with these 
transnational corporations we find another set of sovereign nation-states with less overall 
influence than the primary nations in the first tier but with enough power to exert some 
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influence in regards to the overall flow of capital, communication, and technology. 
Lastly, the base of the structure is comprised of both subordinate nation-states with little 
to no global influence and organizations, such as NGOs, that "represent popular interests 
in the global power arrangement.,,20 The last tier is of course analogous to democracy. 
This is the networked constellation of powers that comprise Empire and can be 
considered responsible for the various global exchanges we see today. Far from being 
material best suited for conspiracy theory, Negri's concept of Empire is based on 
empirical observation. Detractors cannot argue that these various entities do not exist. 
All that Negri has done is arrange them in a structural model that gives us some sense of 
their relative authority and interaction while simultaneously articulating the fact that they 
all share some stake in the vast, complicated network of global power. What we have, 
then, is a non-univocal structure of authority that in various ways imposes order on the 
teeming masses of humanity. What we have is a material, political version of a 
transcendent apparatus, a kind of political finalism that in all likelihood finds its genesis 
in metaphysical transcendence. Negri has gone to great lengths to illustrate the 
hollowness - the empty formalism and structuralism - of Empire's constitution. Indeed, 
one of the fundamental axioms of ontological constructivism is that political finalism 
(more specifically, Empire's apparatuses of capture and command) are devoid of 
creativity, innovation, and progress, incapable of constructing the social field and 
therefore incapable of engaging in any act of ontological constitution. 
Empire is instead completely dependent on the ontological energies that reside in 
the constructive acts of communication and interaction in the multitude.21 It is here, with 
potentia, that the structure of reality is being organized. The polyvocal hierarchy of 
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command is certainly a form of Power (potestas) , and indeed a versatile orgamsm 
capable of defying descriptive analysis or formal interpretation, but nonetheless it is a 
kind of retroactive authority that folds back onto and subsumes the primary innovations 
that initially escape its grasp. Negri puts this quite eloquently in the sixth thesis of his 
"Twenty Theses on Marx," and it will be beneficial to quote at length: 
In effect, capitalist innovation is always a product, a compromise or a response, 
in short a constraint which derives from workers' antagonism. From this point 
of view, capital often experiences progress as decline. 
And it is a decline, or better, a deconstruction. The more radical the innovation 
is, the more profound and powerful were the antagonistic proletarian forces 
which had determined it, and therefore the more extreme was the force which 
capital had to put in motion to dominate them. Every innovation is a revolution 
which failed - but also one which was attempted. Every innovation is the 
secularization of revolution. 22 
Negri is quite clear on the matter: the revolutionary antagonism of the multitude is 
onto logically primary. It precedes the parasitical subsumption enacted by the logic of 
capitalism; indeed, it determines the form and nature of capitalism itself. With this in 
mind, it becomes clear that the contemporary age of the social worker, one defined by a 
shift away from factory-based labour and towards communication, knowledge, and 
interaction, is a product of resistance and revolution on the part of the multitude. The fact 
that these characteristics are central to the modem workspace illustrates not, as many 
would have it, the entrepreneurial genius intrinsic to our mode of production, or the 
metamorphosis of capitalism into a higher form based on its own internal dynamism, but 
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instead the revolutionary capacities and potentialities that belong to the multiplicity of 
social beings pushing for freedom and transformation. From this perspective, the 
development of capitalism into a totalizing reality is less a metamorphosis and more a 
transmogrification, a retroactive integration of the multitude's push for change that has 
resulted in newer, more elusive mechanisms of exploitation and power. However, at the 
same time this transition has revealed what Negri calls a "crisis" in capitalism's theory of 
value, an inability to schematize the newly developed social reality into an economic one, 
to "monetize" our collective capacity, or, to return to Negri's wording, secularize 
revolution. This crisis will occupy our attention more exclusively in a following section. 
For now, the main point is that Negri has established Empire (and capitalism, as its 
economic form) in antagonism to the act of ontological construction. 
Empire will also serve us as the primary example of the connection between 
metaphysical and political transcendence, a useful illustration of the fact that abstract 
metaphysical finalism provides the conceptual paradigms and logistics for a version of 
concrete political finalism. Further, while for Negri the latter is a lifeless framework of 
power and authority (potestas), a pure abstraction, it must be emphasized (once again) 
that this form of Power is constantly combated by its antagonist (potentia) - the dynamic 
of political resistance supported by the ontological act of creative construction. Our brief 
detour into the Negri's analysis of Empire is therefore justified: it is the missing piece of 
a generalized puzzle that includes, on the one side, protest and revolution (supported by 
real ontology), and, on the other, hierarchy and Power (supported by abstract or pseudo 
ontology). Still, to expand this general schema and justify some of our ontological claims 
we must return once again to our analysis of Hegel. 
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1.2 MEDIATION 
We have already seen that the concept of mediation appears in Hegel's 
epistemological views. To reiterate, Zeitgeist (and the epistemological paradigms that 
Zeitgeist includes) is the mediating factor between the knowledge-seeking subject and his 
object, the external world. In other words, the world is only known to us through the lens 
or filter of cultural norms and conventions. While Hegel's reliance on cultural context is 
certainly an important instance of mediation within his system, a closer look at the 
Phenomenology of Spirit reveals that mediation, far from being a side-note or tangent, is 
the glue that binds the entire operation of the dialectic together; it is the engine of the 
dialectical movement itself. 
In the same manner that Zeitgeist mediates the subject-object epistemic relation, 
Hegel's movement toward the "absolute standpoint," a move analogized by the ascending 
of a ladder, likewise requires a mediating factor. In other words, Hegel may very well 
employ the term 'mediation' in various sections to illustrate Consciousness' relation to 
the outside world, but the very structure of the Phenomenology's argumentation, of 
Hegel's ascension toward an absolute standpoint, relies equally on mediation. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the Preface, especially the colourful metaphors 
Hegel consistently turns to: 
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that 
the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom 
is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now 
emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from 
one another; they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at 
the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity ... 23 
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As made explicit by this imagery, Consciousness' movement toward an "absolute 
standpoint," its Bildung, entails what Hegel calls a "labor of the negative." Opposing and 
contradictory theses must be worked through, just as the fruit-form of the plant supplants 
its blossom-form. The blossom-tree is worked through; it is a necessary stage for the 
emergence of fruit. In this sense, it acts as a mediator. To pursue Flay's line ofthinking, 
each stage of the blossom-tree is unconditionally necessary for progression, and, 
concordantly, this progression entails Arbeit, a process of working through. Thus, each 
stage of the plant (or each developmental phase of the individual) is a mediator; it 
mediates between a lower and higher junction, just as epistemic mediation bridges the 
gap between knower and known. 
It becomes increasingly clear that the overall structure of the Phenomenology can 
be considered in terms of mediation. For this very reason Hegel claims at the outset of 
the Preface that philosophical prefaces are superfluous: they are bankrupt in that the very 
act of explaining "aim" and "result" at the outset of a philosophical system ignores the 
necessary process of labour, the working through of antithetical perspectives: "the aim by 
itself is a lifeless universal, just as the guiding tendency is a mere drive that as yet lacks 
an actual existence; and the bare result is the corpse which has left the guiding tendency 
behind it.,,24 Thus, as Hegel works through the various arguments of the text, the 
necessity of mediation is the glue that binds the quasi-unrelated sections together: it 
subsumes the polyvocal expressions of the Phenomenology under a singular, guiding act 
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of Bildung. This is all quite clear, especially given the fact that Hegel's phraseology 
becomes anomalously illuminative and lucid when discussing the labour of the negative. 
What is also clear is that the very structure of the Phenomenology is a textual 
representation of the dialectic itself. As history moves closer to its reunion with the 
Absolute, oppositional views are synthesized and restructured. In political terms, the 
monarchies of Europe were a necessary stepping stone for the emergence of democracy. 
The monarchical system mediated the process of dialectical progress. In this sense, every 
idea, every system of thought or headway into a subject, exists as a bridge in the service 
of teleological progress. It is this very focus on teleology and mediation that anchors the 
entire system, and without this focus it seems that the labour of the negative crumbles and 
is rendered incoherent. Mediation, the motor of dialectic progress, is the lynchpin of the 
entire operation. 
Another look at the Preface will help crystallize this matter. Hegel distinguishes 
between two forms of thought which he terms 'speculative' and 'ratiocinative,' and 
expresses their difference in terms of a subject-predicate language-form. As the 
conventional cognition of the natural sciences, ratiocinative thought attempts to 
understand the world in terms of an axiomatic subject, a fixed and stable entity to be 
predicated in numerous ways: 
Usually, the Subject is first made the basis, as the objective, fixed self; thence 
the necessary movement to the multiplicity of determination or Predicates 
proceeds. Here, that subject is replaced by the knowing 'I' itself, which links 
the Predicates with the Subj ect holding them.25 
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Speculative thought, on the other hand, abolishes the need for a universally fixed subject, 
and instead employs each predicate as a subject in and of itself (although the term 
'subject' is largely inadequate). The subject passes over into the predicate as the latter 
becomes a better, fuller expression of the essence hitherto unexpressed. Likewise, this 
newly formed predicate will also be transformed by the next, and so on ad infinitum: the 
subject "has been sublated; and, since in this way what seems to be the Predicate has 
become the whole and the independent mass ... ,,26 
A contemporary mathematical model of this process is found with the Markov 
chain: a mathematical sequence or strand of calculations where each number is 
determined by the one before it. Similarly, the following calculation is based upon the 
one before it, so that what one is presented with is a string of calculations (a 
mathematical ladder), a sequence that also models the notion of mediation discussed 
above. Each number is a mediator for the next, just as each predicate is a step along a 
never-ending chain of predicates, the flower is a more adequate expression of truth than 
the seed, and every moment in Hegel's dialectic is part of some larger structure of 
mediation where a higher level of Consciousness is the final product. 
Of course, Hegel does not necessarily consider the process of mediation (as it is 
construed here) an abandonment of previous expressions of truth: they continue to exist 
as parts, as aggregates, of the next expression. Hegel expresses this in his belief that 
"The True is the whole.,,27 Nonetheless, it seems impossible not to imagine that 
particular aspects of the overarching system, previous mediators, are not done a 
fundamental injustice by way of this progression toward an "absolute standpoint." They 
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have been used for some higher purpose, assimilated but not quite the same: the seed is 
an aggregate-aspect of the flower, but it has lost its own unique existence, its in-itself. 
1.3 MEDIATION AS MISUNDERSTANDING 
Like many theorists, Hardt describes the abovementioned Hegelian process as a 
"negative movement," an ontology based on antagonistic opposites, on otherness and 
discord. At the same time, it becomes apparent that this negative movement, this reliance 
on mediation and teleology, rests on certain ontological assumptions. More specifically~ 
Hegel, like Plato and Aristotle before him, assumes the existence of ontological gradation 
- the idea that objects and entities display varying grades or levels of reality. As 
discussed earlier, Platonic fmalism posits that, while the material world of particulars is 
certainly real, it is nevertheless a diluted or distilled version of reality analogous to 
shadows. Forms, on the other hand, exhibit a higher degree of reality and are considered 
the true and worthy objects of intellectual pursuit. Plato's ontology therefore 
disfranchises the material world and renders our most immediate and practical pursuits -
political action, for instance - mere shadow-play when compared to purely a priori 
contemplation. 
Hegel may not disfranchise the material world (at least not in the same way), but 
he does certainly create levels of ontological gradation. Since Hegel's negative 
movement is one towards the absolute standpoint, towards an ultimate version of reality 
and perfection, the levels that precede this point in time are diluted forms of an eventual 
and unavoidable ontological plateau. The machine that eventually produces perfection 
must first produce inferior versions, must produce seeds, for example, before flowers, or 
children before men. Driven by mediation, what we see in Hegel is a form of linear 
26 
temporal development at the ontological level. As time marches forward reality is 
constructed as the by-product of dialectical conflict and synthesis. Whereas in Plato we 
are given a simpler account of things, a universe divided into two static, stationary 
degrees of reality (synchronic), Hegel presents a dynamic account of ever-increasing, 
ever-improving gradations of being (diachronic). It is for this reason (primarily) that the 
Hegelian dialectic stands as the true enemy of Negri's account of Spinozistic constitution, 
for, much like Empire itself, the teleological march of mediation is presented as a shifting 
dynamic of production. 
To claim that Empire is the direct descendent of Hegelianism would be somewhat 
misleading. Late capitalism - and the various political entities that redeploy its logic - is 
the end-product of a long series of developments in the social and political spheres, a 
sequence of social and technological advancements. Most of this goes on without any 
recourse to theory. It would not be misleading, on the other hand, to propose the 
existence of a very specific connection between Empire and transcendent theory in 
general. If finalism is as prevalent as Negri claims, if the superimposition of abstract 
structure and form is a relatively ubiquitous affair in our intellectual pursuits, then surely 
the politico-economic reality of late capitalism is intricately connected to the long history 
of transcendent thought that now exists as a kind of governing rule. In this sense, we can 
legitimately establish the very real and material connection between transcendent thought 
in theory and transcendent structure in reality. The fact that Hegel's negative ontology 
occupies a rather esteemed position in the former category makes it clear why the 
capitalist's tendency to trumpet the "end of history" sounds so very Hegelian. 
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In opposition to this tradition, Negri's reliance on Spinoza and his refusal to 
accept mediation and difference asserts his alternative ontology as both a radical, 
subversive departure from the tradition and a foundation for political action and 
improvement. As we see in The Savage Anomaly, Negri appropriates Spinoza's 
fundamental distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata. Spinoza uses the 
terms to exemplify two different facets in nature - first, natura naturans, the active, 
productive element in nature, the engine or motor that produces being, and, second, 
natura naturata, the finalized product of nature, the modes. Interestingly, a less 
revolutionary Spinoza could have delineated this distinction in accordance with previous 
models of ontological difference and gradation. He could have, for instance, construed 
natura naturans as a process of ontological production that reaches, like Hegelianism, for 
an absolute end-point. As a result, he would have relegated this facet of nature to a lower 
status, a lesser, diminutive level of reality. At the same time, this hypothetical Spinoza 
would have perhaps championed natura naturata as a final cause, a correlate of the 
Hegelian Absolute or Platonic Form. This would have been in line with the tradition of 
metaphysical finalism so prominent in philosophy's past. This would have provided yet 
another form of finalism capable of being molded and transformed into a political 
structure sharing similar characteristics. 
Instead, Spinoza defines natura naturans (production) and natura naturata 
(product) as two aspects of the same substance, two facets in complete, simultaneous 
harmony. As a result: 
God is the inversion of transcendence, even while being simple logical 
transcendence. God is the world that constitutes itself. There is no mediation; 
the singularity represents the unique real horizon. God lives the singularity. 
The mode is both the world and God.28 
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Whereas many philosophers (Leibniz, for example) present traditional concepts of God 
(i.e. Gods that operate outside the parameters of everyday existence), Spinoza, 
sidestepping the religious conventions of the West, offers a more complex view: nature as 
the wellspring of existence, the constant force pushing toward actuality. Everything that 
is, in this sense, everything that we as individuals see, is operating according to the 
mechanism of nature: everything is an artifact of God's infinite production. 
Concurrently, in the form of natura naturata, modes are not only the products of this 
active mechanism of creativity, of the "spontaneity of being," but part of its totality. 
Negri puts this nicely by calling attributes and modes the "legislation of being," and by 
this he simply means the organizing principles whereby the univocal nature of natura 
naturans turns polyvocal, where that which is unitary and whole is seemingly sectioned-
off and structured. This is no paradox. Spinoza's metaphysics is in complete harmony 
with its own implosion of a) the univocal thrust of productive force, and b) the fact that, 
"The world is therefore the versatile and complex combination of singularities.,,29 
It is not that one leads into the other (i.e. the singular becoming the manifold via a 
process), but rather that the singular and manifold coexist from the beginning, are ipso 
facto the same. To say otherwise would be to tum Spinoza's radically new and rebellious 
system into a philosophy of transcendence. 
This is precisely the association Negri is combating in The Savage Anomaly. 
Spinoza's Ethics presents the reader with an ontology of level surfaces (or flatness), a 
metaphysics of anti-transcendence, and it is for this reason that his philosophy is best 
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equipped to provide the conceptual tools for an effective critique of capitalism and its 
manifold apparatuses. 
1.4 Beyond Hegel 
The question remains as to whether or not Negri - and by extension Spinoza - has 
managed to bypass the fundamental problem presented by Hegel's dialectic. As Hardt 
points out, taking a position that is in any way anti-Hegelian is paradoxically and 
simultaneously Hegelian. In other words, oppositional, anti-Hegelian doctrines are 
subsumed within the dialectical movement of negativity - they are positioned as an 
intellectual development within the parameters of Hegelian logic and are therefore 
merely theories that have a small role in Consciousness' progress. Continental post-
structuralism has surely been immobilized by this impasse. But perhaps their dilemma is 
a result of an inability or unwillingness to position themselves contra Hegel in 
ontological terms, to set themselves against the dialectic not as this or that theory but as a 
radical reworking of the ontological landscape in its entirety. Post-structuralism is 
notorious for its apparent contempt for philosophical foundations, for a deliberate 
movement away from (and deconstruction of) the anchoring, ontological rudiments that 
support the vast majority of our philosophical assumptions. 
By disregarding foundation, however, it is possible that Hegel wins automatically: 
the dialectic is built on the sturdy foundation of negative ontology; it is supported by the 
contention that reality is composed of disharmonious elements that, after a period of 
antagonism and conflict, synthesize into new arrangements awaiting future conflict. This 
process continues indefinitely. For Hegel, the negative is not an abstraction but the very 
nature of reality; therefore, if anti-Hegelianism is possible it must set itself against Hegel 
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in ontological terms and prove that the dialectic is constructed on the basis of a series of 
ontological misunderstandings. In this way, a theory can be posed as the antithesis to the 
Hegelian dialectic in toto, not to this or that theory falling under the umbrella of the 
dialectic. 
While Hardt's "The Art of Organization" does not present this specific solution to 
the problem, it does provide a comprehensive analysis of the antagonism between 
Spinoza's immanent, materialist ontology and the Hegelian variant - negative ontology. 
In an early passage, Hardt outlines Hegel's attack on positive being: 
Since Spinoza's being is absolutely positive, since in Spinoza pure being does 
not actively negate nothingness and does not proceed through a negative 
movement, it lacks the fundamental difference which could define its real 
existence ... Negation cannot merely be passively 'thought away', Hegel 
maintains, but it must be actively engaged and really negated - this is the role of 
the process of determination. Consequently, finally, inevitable, because 
Spinoza's being is not held different from nothingness as its opposite, it 
dissolves into nothingness ... 30 
The legitimacy and accuracy of this critique is beside the point (although Hegel, it seems, 
would have to prove the irreconcilability of purely positive being and difference). It 
seems quite clear, however, that if negation can indeed be "thought away," then the entire 
edifice of Hegelianism and negative ontology could no longer stand as an infallible meta-
theory impervious to critique and opposition. If Negri's interpretation of Spinoza does 
not provide the immediate ability to negate negative ontology, at the very least it provides 
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the conceptual tools to "think away" the dialectic and deconstruct the harmful political 
realities that too readily emerge from its conclusions.31 
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2. CREATIVE PRODUCTION 
While our analysis of Hegel has plainly defined the lines of conflict and 
antagonism in terms of philosophical heritage, it becomes clear that dividing ontological 
doctrines into two camps - transcendent and immanent - does a fundamental disservice 
to the variety and assortment of these perspectives. Nowhere is this clearer than with the 
obvious polyvalence of Hegel's own doctrine, or Spinoza's for that matter; still, our 
central claim is that certain ontological frameworks have a tendency to support certain 
political perspectives. To use an example, Spinoza's development of a "flat" or anti-
hierarchical ontology naturally develops and facilitates a politics of anti-transcendence: 
the characteristics of the ontological doctrine carry over as a foundation or support into 
the political expression or representation of this doctrine. Before explicating in detail the 
manner in which Negri's interpretation of Spinoza provides the foundation for what he 
terms a "constituent republic," a brief evaluation of the opposite phenomenon - the 
transition from transcendent ontology to transcendent politics - is perhaps in order. We 
have already examined this transition in general (noting the manner in which the entire 
tradition of transcendent ontology provides the conceptual paradigm for corresponding 
political structures); nonetheless, a specific example of this transition will aid an 
understanding of the relationships between various forms of finalism. 
2.2 THE PITFALLS OF LAZZARATO'S NEO-MONADOLOGY 
In my view, despite good intentions and dedication to a political cause in line with 
Negri's, Maurizio Lazzarato's "From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life" provides an 
explicit example of this transition. Lazzarato' s investigation utilizes a Leibnizian, 
monadological framework to explicate the means by which modem enterprises produce, 
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first and foremost, worlds that envelope the worker and consumer. On this view, before 
the production of concrete goods comes an intangible process whereby the corporation 
produces - via advertising and other forms of communication - a specific world, one 
manufactured in such a way so as to effectively execute what he calls "incorporeal 
transformation." In his words: 
... the enterprise does not create its object (goods) but the world within which 
the object exists. And secondly, the enterprise does not create its subjects 
(workers and consumers) but the world within which the subject exists.32 
What is important here is the idea that in the contemporary age of mass advertising and 
mass marketability, the most efficient way to market products, to incur revenue, is to first 
of all manipulate the way that people think, to manipulate the sensibilities of individuals 
in such a way that they buy into the world of the product. This, then, establishes the 
fundamental importance of "incorporeal transformations": the consumer's sensibilities 
and dispositions must be manufactured before any concrete production of goods can take 
place, before items and products can be created that match the nature and constitution of 
the subject. 
This is certainly becoming the hegemonic form of production: the ubiquitous 
focus on marketing and advertising is testament to its dominance. It may be helpful, 
nonetheless, to turn to an example of Lazzarato's: 
Three years ago, Alcatel, a large French multi-national announced that it would 
let go of its eleven production factories. This separation between the enterprise 
and the factory is an extreme case, but one that is becoming more and more 
common within contemporary capitalism. In the great majority of cases, these 
two functions are integrated, but I would argue that their separation IS 
emblematic of a deep transformation within capitalist mode of production. 33 
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Yet this focus on the corporation's principal construction of reality (a reality primary to 
the action of the worker and consumer) seemingly leads us away from Hardt and Negri's 
fundamental thesis that capitalism is a vampiristic logic that merely feeds off of the 
ontologically primary production of the multitude. This notion is furthered by 
Lazzarato's conclusions that, for example: 
Here we are facing a paradigmatic change that we cannot capture if we start 
from the concepts of labour, of praxis. Indeed, these concepts could give us a 
false image of what production is today: the process we have just described [the 
process of incorporeal transformation] precedes all organizations of work (and 
non-work). 34 
Lazzarato's analysis seems to lead us towards a notion that capitalism and its various 
institutions are creative figureheads, the centers of ontological production and the cores 
of subjectivity. Capitalism, in this sense, is the force at the hegemonic axis of movement, 
a divot in space with enough gravitational force to coordinate the activities of other 
interstellar bodies. 
At an initial glance, the link to Leibnizian metaphysics only extends this 
conclusion. For Leibniz, every soul (nomad) is already imprinted with its own future, 
already theologically stamped with the seal of its own fate. 35 In other words, since God is 
timeless and therefore all-seeing, the future of every individual is already encoded within 
its own constitution. 
In Leibniz' swords, 
... the notion of an individual substance includes once and for all everything that 
can every happen to it [ ... ] by considering this notion, one can see there 
everything that can truly be said of it, just as we can see in the nature of a circle 
all the properties that can be deduced from it.36 
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After considering this, we can draw an easy parallel between Lazzarato's notion of 
"incorporeal transformation" and Leibniz's form of soft determinism. Like an all-
knowing, all-powerful corporate-head imprinting products with the stamp of eternity, the 
Leibnizian God infuses the universe into each and every monad. 
For Lazzarato, corporations imprint workers and consumers with the signature of 
their own idiosyncratic worlds; the logic of the enterprise, in other words, is " .. .inscribed 
in the souls and bodies ... ,,37 of the men and women necessary for the company's 
longevity and functionality. We see this form of corporate metaphysics everywhere. Is it 
necessary to conclude, however, that the creativity inherent in this process is 
ontologically prior to the multitude's actions and reactions? Will it be necessary to admit 
that capitalism is an autonomous entity capable of constructing worlds independent of the 
individuals that inhabit them? 
It seems apparent that adopting a Leibnizian framework to understand the nuances 
of modem production leads to an affirmative answer. Conversely, Lazzarato's own 
analysis (although hitherto portrayed as supporting a notion of corporate creativity) 
navigates beyond this impasse. 
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2.3 LAZZARATO BEYOND LEIBNIZ 
One of the means by which Lazzarato resists the above dilemma is the concept he 
terms "the cooperation between minds." Here, the fundamentally Leibnizian construal of 
the constitutive primacy of marketing strategies and corporate creativity is reversed: 
"Cooperation between minds expresses a power of co-creation and co-realization which 
means, in this specific domain, the capacity of creating and realizing (free) software.,,38 
Labour - and here labour should be understood in the broadest sense possible - is not 
secondary to the conditions corporations employ to mold human productivity to their own 
ends, not inferior to the hierarchical process of incorporeal transformation so integral to 
the functioning of modem capitalism. Indeed, the situation is the complete reverse: 
corporate enterprises operate first and foremost by vampiristically feeding off the vast 
expanse of common goods that are produced by human labour in general. They do not 
form and direct this labour; they do not twist and manipulate its constitution in any 
primary way - they merely benefit from its inherent creativity by introducing it into the 
global market and incurring profit. In other words, they attempt to viciously 
transmogrify the common into something private: 
Cooperation between minds, unlike cooperation in the Smithian and Marxian 
factory, produces public, collective or common goods: knowledge, language, 
science, culture, art, information, forms of life, relations with oneself, others 
and the world etc. We distinguish common goods and public or collective 
goods as understood in political economy. Indeed, the former are not only like 
water, air and nature etc. - 'goods' of all - but rather created and realized like 
the modalities that Marcel Duchamp uses to speak about artistic creation. A 
work of art is indeed for one half the result of the activity of the artist and for 
the other half the result of the activity of the public (which looks at it, reads it, 
or listens to it)?9 
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This is precisely the interpersonal, creative dynamic that defines the productive capacity 
of the multitude - constructive power that is the ontological force behind society in 
general. 
When considering the metaphysical tendency of enterprises to create worlds, 
Lazzarato explains that the invention of these worlds is primary, while the actual 
production of the goods or services that coincides with them is in fact a reproduction, a 
material simulacra of a corporate reality. This is certainly true: the worker-monad (to use 
Lazzarato's Leibnizian terminology) operates within the world created by God, and all of 
its creative endeavors are conditioned to some extent by its transcendent origins. With 
our newfound understanding of the cooperation between minds, however, we can analyze 
the process from an elevated vantage-point. We now see that the multitude's production 
of common goods - science, culture, language - precedes the corporate process of world-
making. The latter process, then, is ersatz in nature: it is the true reproduction, a 
reprocessing of pre-existing goods in some other form. 
Any marketable product is always formed out of the collective knowledge that 
made that product possible in the first place, and that knowledge, as Lazzarato effectively 
points out, is intrinsically common: "A common good," he states, "is inexchangeable 
because of its indivisible and inappropriable nature.,,40 How do you divide a concept? 
How do you consume an idea? Unlike the factory-goods hegemonic in Marx's analysis, 
contemporary production is beginning to revolve around the paradigm of intangible 
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'goods,' around what Hardt and Negri term "immaterial labour," "labour that creates 
immaterial products, such as knowledge, information, communication, a relationship, or 
an emotional response.,,41 
This is precisely why the contemporary market is seemg increasingly absurd 
examples of ownership claims. Aware of the newfound significance and profitability of 
intellectual products, corporations are quick to secure the ownership rights of any idea 
capable of earning revenue. Considering, however, what Lazzarato says about the nature 
of common goods, it becomes apparent just how preposterous and counter-progressive 
such claims are. 
Ideas never develop in vacuous environments. Even Kant, notorious for crafting 
the first Critique in isolation, could not have achieved what he did without interacting 
with the philosophical concepts developed by his contemporaries. He was, after all, not 
only an astute critic of the metaphysical tradition, but a great synthesizer of the disparate 
epistemological systems. Hardt, Negri, and Lazzarato make it explicitly clear where they 
stand on the issue; furthermore, their respective treatments of common goods and labour 
are completely in line with one another. 
The only difference, then, and the only grounds for critique, is the dissimilar 
philosophical paradigms they operate within. Lazzarato moves beyond the limitations of 
his own philosophical framework by employing the notion of 'cooperation between 
minds,' and by insisting on its ontological predominance. Before moving on to examine 
the manner in which a Spinozian context is better suited to encompass such an insistence, 
it will help to first examine an argument that may support a correlation between Leibniz's 
thinking and a focus on collective productivity. 
In "From Capital-Labour to Capital-Life," Lazzarato explains: 
As Tarde rightly saw, Leibniz allows us to escape from the dilemmas involved 
in the relationship between individual and collective, and thus both from 
individualism and holism, since the collective and the social (the world ill 
Leibniz's language) are included in the individuality of the monad.42 
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In the context of Leibnizian metaphysics, this is perfectly accurate: utilizing God as a 
kind of transcendent anchor for his entire system, Leibniz is able to move beyond the 
bifurcation between individual and collective. This is in part due to his explication of 
God as an atemporal being possessing an omniscient knowledge of every possible 
perspective of the universe. The universe, in other words, can be viewed from many 
angles, but God's view is the sum of every possible angle, potential or actual, past or 
future. For every perspective, though, God creates a corresponding substance. As 
explained in his Discourse on Metaphysics: 
The result of each view of the universe, as seen from a certain position, is a 
substance which expresses the universe in conformity with this view, should 
God see fit to render his thought actual and to produce this substance.43 
Therefore, every substance contains its own radically singular and thoroughly 
idiosyncratic universe - this is the substance's individuality. On the other hand, these 
separate universes are harmonious with one another: they correspond in such a logical 
way that, for instance, communication and collective observation are possible, or, in 
Leibniz's words, " .. .in the same way that several people who have agreed to meet in 
some place at some specified time can really do this if they so desire,,44 - this is the 
substance's collective facet. 
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Obviously, then, Leibniz is successful in combining individuality and collectivity 
- the univocal and polyvocal - in a single substance: a monad. What seems to render his 
progress unfitting for our current purposes, however, is his abovementioned reliance on a 
transcendent anchor. The opening two sentences of his On the Ultimate Origination of 
Things claim: 
Beyond the world, that is, beyond the collection of finite things, there is some 
One Being who rules, not only as the soul is the ruler in me, or, better, as the 
self is the ruler in my body, but also in a much higher sense. For the One Being 
who rules the universe not only rules the world, but also fashions or creates it; 
he is above the world, and, so to speak, extramundane, and therefore his is the 
ultimate reason for things.45 [emphasis added] 
This is a formulation of the 'principle of sufficient reason,' the centerpiece of his entire 
philosophy. Everything is related in a causal network, but it is nonsense to assume there 
is no transempirical cause supporting the entire structure: God is this cause; his is, in 
other words, the sufficient reason for all things. 
In returning to our previous considerations, however, we can see that this 
emphasis on God's transcendent status is the very reason Leibnizian metaphysics 
provides problems when applied to contemporary politics and economics. Indeed, we 
have already seen this in terms of the analogy between God's inscription of the universe 
in the monads and the corporation's inscription of its world in the worker and consumer. 
By following the analogy to its logical conclusion, we inject our contemporary political-
economic landscape with a noxious dose oftranscendent philosophy, thereby attributing a 
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kind of omnipotent status to corporate entities devoid of any umque creativity or 
productive capacity. 
2.4 BEYOND THE INDIVIDUAL/COLLECTIVE BINARY WITH SPINOZA 
Spinoza likewise bypasses the division between the individual and the collective, 
and surprisingly does so in a manner quite akin to Leibniz, although differing in some 
principal respects. It may be helpful, then, to tum to an example utilized by Leibniz, and 
modify it accordingly to explain the manner in which Spinoza's outlook differs. The 
example is simplistic, but an effective place, I believe, to begin. To emphasize the 
disjunction between God's theocentric perspective and the narrower, anthropocentric 
perspective of monads, Leibniz employs the example of a city. God sees the city in its 
totality, every angle, every dark alley and rooftop is accounted for; indeed (although this 
makes things more complex) he sees every possible city, the way the city could be in an 
infinite number of permutations. Alternatively, monads only see the city from a single 
point of view; one monad sees something the other does not - say, the side of a building 
- while, conversely, the other sees one side of the same building missing from the other's 
standpoint. This is the Leibnizian picture of things. 
Spinoza's God/nature, rather than perceiving the entire city, rather than "looking 
down" upon it from some transcendent plateau, is the entire city. We, as individual 
modes of God's attributes (thought and extension) are the bits and pieces of the city; we 
are separate buildings, but nonetheless simultaneously belonging to the overarching 
cityscape, to nature - but this is only one dimension of Spinoza's view of nature, what 
was previously described as natura naturata (nature natured). His other, natura naturans 
(nature naturing), signifies the active, productive principle of God or nature, something 
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Negri, in The Savage Anomaly, calls the 'spontaneity of being': pure productive force, the 
ontological motor of the world. In Negri's words: "This given complex of being is the 
element in which we live, the fabric from which all is woven,,46 - and later, 
Every sign of abstraction is taken away; the category of being is the substance, 
the substance is unique, it is reality. It is neither above nor below reality, it is 
all reality. It has the scent and the tension of the world, it divinely possesses 
both unity and plurality. Absolute being is the surface of the world.47 
This, then, is the central (although not only) aspect that divides the two philosophers 
being considered. As we can see, Spinoza's eschews a conventional, religious 
interpretation of nature in favour of a materialistic view that elevates the world of objects 
as the only possible ontological category. Again, it is this materialism that directly 
contradicts the tradition of transcendence and pinpoints Spinoza's positive ontology as 
the possible foundation for a future political system free from capitalist rule. 
2.5 TIME-AS-MEASURE 
In terms of our analysis of Negri, we can now move from an abstract 
understanding of constitutive production, the concept of being as a product of human 
action and understanding, to a more concrete notion of a specific kind of ontological 
constructivism as it exists in the context of temporality. For Negri, time plays a defining, 
central role, both in the political register (time as a qualitative measure) and in purely 
philosophical terms (time as a phenomenological horizon). Once again, temporality in 
both of these senses is shown to be fundamentally related and inseparable. 
We can turn to the opening sections of Negri's "The Constitution of Time: the 
timepieces of capital and communist liberation" for a foundation regarding temporal 
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constitution. He begins by explicating the idea of time as quantitative measure. In the 
period of Fordist production, the period of what Negri calls the "mass worker," time can 
be seen as an external unit of measure that quantifies the work day and assigns value to 
any given product. The work day, then, is obviously divided into temporal quantities 
(hours, days etc) and the products of this labour-time are assigned a use-value according 
to the traditional Marxist formula: a labourer spends, for example, an hour manufacturing 
a product, and this product's value is assigned according to the time-quantity itself. The 
shoe that takes an hour to manufacture is therefore equivalent to the shirt that also takes 
an hour to make. Simply, each object is valued according to the labour-time that is 
materialized in it. 
This simple conception of time is problematized by the phenomenon of real-
subsumption. Once we transition away from the Fordist model of production into the era 
of the social worker, it becomes apparent that work-time and leisure-time are 
indistinguishable. The labourer can no longer retreat to a home away from capitalist 
accumulation, away from the necessities and demands of corporate production.48 We can 
point to several examples to illustrate this point, but it is more important to note that, 
since the hegemonic form of production no longer hinges on a corporeal object (car 
manufacturing, for example) and instead relies on knowledge and ideas, workers stop 
producing the former at the end of the day but never cease producing the latter. Capitalist 
organizations are aware of this fact and consequently demand the continued, 
uninterrupted creation of knowledge-based products regardless of the time of day (this 
reality is surely one of the fundamental observations linking various forms of neo-
Marxist theory together). Therefore, capitalist accumulation has invested itself in every 
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aspect of life to such a degree that we can no longer consider the existence of an outside 
to the capitalist modality - this is the reality of real-subsumption. 
This expansion of capitalism to the point that it subsumes within it all aspects of 
existence and life has several repercussions. Of interest here is the fact that it renders 
purely quantitative time a manifest absurdity. Negri himself articulates the absurdity by 
stating "When the entire time of life has become the time of production, who measures 
whom?,,49 Measure, then, is " ... flattened onto the process itself." It no longer has the 
benefit of exteriority, the distance and difference necessary for a purely quantitative 
consideration of labour. Time-as-measure can continue to operate, but only as a 
tautology that reduces everything to units of time, all the same, all redundant. 
This "aporia," as Negri calls it, is inherent in the writings of the "orthodox Marx." 
Only with Marx's more revolutionary works - the Grundrisse, for example - do we find 
that he is able to comprehend and transcend the tautology of time-as-measure. In Negri's 
words: 
... alongside the abstract development of social mediatization and of the 
subjectification of abstract labour, time itself becomes substance, to the point 
that time becomes the fabric of the whole of being, because all of being is 
implicated in the web of the relation of production: being is equal to product of 
labour: temporal being. 50 
What could previously be considered, in a pejorative sense, the "tautology of time and 
life" is therefore resurrected as a newfound understanding, a new sense of time not as 
measure but as substance51 that "cleaves to reality." We will return to the concept of 
time-as-substance, but first it will be necessary to underscore what Negri believes to be 
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the radical, subversive nature of what we can tenn a phenomenological concept of time, a 
temporality divorced from a purely economic or purely logical construal. 
In a brief section situated again at the opening of "The Constitution of Time," 
Negri posits two historical trajectories. First we have time in the theological tradition. In 
this context time is a mere roadblock or impasse in the way of understanding an 
atemporal, transcendent reality. For theological scholars dedicated to the analysis of 
transcendent being, time is an incompatible variable, an illusion unique to the material 
world. Negri decides not to discuss Plato in detail (although he does quote him); 
nevertheless, considering our previous and partial analysis of Platonic metaphysics as a 
fonn of finalism, it will perhaps help to return once again to his theories. As we know, 
Plato construed the material world of particulars in tenns of a diluted, degraded fonn of 
reality. Time plays a part in this. The material world is at least partially associated with 
the incomprehensible flux described by Heraclitus: the transition of one season to the 
next; the constant fluctuation of natural phenomena from one state to the other; all of 
these occurrences owe their confusion and non-unifonnity to the persistent flow of time. 
Plato successfully married the Heraclitean flux with Pannenidean unifonnity and 
"oneness" by connecting the degraded material realm to the higher ontological sphere of 
the Fonns. Here Pannenides' insistence on the illogical nature of change and multiplicity 
finds a horne; Platonic Ideas resurrect the concept of the timelessness and univocality of 
the world. 
Theological time is represented in this idea, and although Negri passes over the 
example, we can see that the ontological dualism inherent in Plato is reiterated in various 
fonns by subsequent thinkers: 
When the practice of theory is directed simply towards the constitution of the 
transcendent, time is non-existence. Time is multiplicity. Time is a theological 
scandal. Time is rebellious. Time is only resolved by transcendence and 
constraint. 52 
46 
The competing trajectory - the materialist tradition - is fundamentally different but at the 
same time guilty for ignoring the substantive, subjective nature of time. According to 
Negri, "For centuries, time has been thought of - materialistically - from within the 
categories of space. ,,53 The materialistic tradition has with few exceptions insisted on 
construing time as secondary or subordinate to the geometric rigidity of spatial 
configurations. 
Negri does, however, find some value in certain strains of materialistic thought. 
Specifically, both Newton and Kant represent for him an attempt at providing a separate, 
independent, and self-contained expression of temporality. In his words, Kant reads the 
temporal realm as "the envelope of the order of temporal events,,,54 detaching temporality 
from the geometric, spatial association lauded by many rationalistic thinkers.· Still, for 
Negri Kant does not go far enough: his use of time as a context or form for cognition still 
retains elements of spiritualistic, theological thinking, elements that neglect to realize the 
full potential of temporality as a phenomenological modality. It is nonetheless interesting 
to note that his brief details concerning Kantian thought return full circle to his Marxist 
analysis. 
By sidestepping the conventional, established approach of both theological and 
materialist interpretations, Marx finally presents time as the mode of production of being, 
as the expression of being's very substance. The Kantian "envelope" is quite similar: 
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time is neither a straightforward measure of quantified segments (as with the "orthodox" 
Marx); a queer anomaly or incalculable variable (as with the theological approach); or a 
mere consequence subservient to geometric space (as we see in what Negri calls 
"materialism"). Time is instead an "Umwelt" that encompasses our creative abilities and 
facilitates our constitutive actions: it runs hand in hand with our creative capacity 
epitomized in the very act of ontological constructivism. For a fuller account of the 
connection between these concepts - the aforementioned constructivism and Negrian 
temporality - we will be greatly benefited by Negri's "Kairos, Alma Venus, Multitudo: 
nine lessons to myself," and an interpretive tool in the form of Cesare Casarino's "Time 
Matters: Marx, Negri, Agamben, and the Corporeal." 
2.6 TIME-AS-SUBSTANCE 
The Constitution of Time has provided us with the basic parameters of the 
philosophical debate on time. As Negri sees it, as with the two competing ontological 
traditions, temporal concepts can be divided into two antagonistic trajectories (the 
division in fact corresponds to the ontological categories). Time-as-measure is 
epitomized in the various traditions that partake in the abstract attempt at superimposing 
a geometric or spatial structure over the phenomenology of time. In political or 
economic terms, Negri points to the capitalists' tendency to quantify the aforementioned 
temporal Umwelt, to divide the work-day into calculable proportions that can be 
exchanged and measured (in Marxian terms, this superimposition is necessary so as to 
divest labour of its use-value and convert it to exchange-value, to make labour a 
marketable commodity). In philosophical terms, Negri points to the various forms of 
materialism that refuse to consider time as anything but subordinate to spatial concepts. 
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On the other end of the spectrum, we have already established - at least in 
embryonic form - the basis of what can be considered Negri's revolutionary time, the 
time of production, of constitution, of substance and social being - an irreducible 
temporality that exists as subjective phenomena rather than cold, mathematical, and 
independent noumena.55 Here we find ourselves on the cusp of a truly communistic 
understanding of time; we begin to realize the concept's importance and also understand 
its relative tendency to be undervalued by political theorists and philosophers alike. 
Casarino similarly underscores both the importance and undervaluation of a new 
concept of time by beginning "Time Matters" with a quote from Agamben: 
The original task of a genuine revolution ... is never merely to 'change the 
world,' but also - and first of all - to 'change time.' Modem political thought 
has concentrated its attention on history, and has not elaborated a corresponding 
conception of time. Even historical materialism has until now neglected to 
elaborate a concept of time that compares with its concept of history. Because 
of this omission it has been unwittingly compelled to have recourse to a concept 
of time dominant in Western culture for centuries, and so harbour, side by side, 
a revolutionary concept of history and a traditional experience of time. 56 
This orthodox, Western tradition is of course the selfsame tradition Negri emphasizes 
with reference to materialism. Casarino has his own terminology: he refers to the 
dominant mode as the "Aristotelian-Hegelian conception of time," a temporal modality 
focused on a, 
" ... lack, negation, and destruction that conspires against the works of human 
history by bringing them down to ruination and reducing them to a heap of dust 
- a time against which humans must fight tirelessly by spatializing, measuring, 
and quantifYing it."s7 
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His reference to Hegel is particularly relevant to our discussion. In line with our previous 
interpretations, Hegel's grand narrative built on negation and conflict (and final causes, 
as with Aristotle) can be considered, in temporal terms, as a prime example of time-as-
measure. By segmenting our past into definitive moments of historical conflict and 
synthesis, by operating from above to develop a superimposed schematic that organizes 
human striving, cooperation, and Bildung into moments that exist as mediating steps for 
the genesis of something higher, the dialectic is certainly guilty of denying the experience 
of time its constitutive, affirmative qualities, of replacing a purer, fuller account of time 
(phenomenological time) with a transcendent and abstract structure. 
Casarino builds his interpretation of the opposing tradition - what we have been 
calling time-as-substance - on the shoulders of a revolutionary temporality implicit in the 
articulation of Epicurean atomism, and, more specifically, Althusser's interpretation of it. 
The details of this inspired interpretation are unnecessary for the matter at hand; needless 
to say, while Negri finds the foundation for constitutive or phenomenological time in the 
work of Spinoza and, more concretely, Spinozian substance, Casarino and Althusser trace 
the subversive strain of temporality to the contingency inherent in the atomistic "creation 
story." With the deviated course of the atom that caused their paths to swerve and 
intersect, temporality comes into being; it springs to life out of the formless, atemporal 
stream of parallel paths and symmetry. As Casarino puts it: "Within this paradigm, time 
and history are not inimical to each other .,. there is no other time outside of a fully 
human and fully historical time."s8 And later: "The realm of freedom ... is always 
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already being constituted here and now in our daily struggle to live the events of our lives 
as fully contingent and yet urgently necessary at one and the same time ... ,,59 It becomes 
obvious that, despite their reliance on divergent philosophical paradigms, Negri (in "The 
Constitution of Time") and Casarino (in "Time Matters") are tracing the outlines of a 
mode of temporality free from overarching teleology and the transcendence endemic to 
both Hegelian-Aristotelian temporality and the varieties of metaphysical finalism 
discussed above. 
Nonetheless, we should be careful when drawing parallels. After all, Casarino's 
thesis is that Negri and Agamben fall short of a fully realized articulation of time-as-
substance, and that this failure is based on their inability to connect time to a concept of 
corporeality: 
In both Agamben and Negri, an attempt to formulate a revolutionary theory of 
time leads to and ends with the question of corporeality. While both thinkers 
declare this question to be essential for such a reconceptualization of time, they 
ultimately fall short of attending to its demanding singularity: their projects are 
- if in different ways - at once indispensable and insufficient for the symbiotic 
articulation of a revolutionary time and a revolutionary body, that is, for the 
production of communism. 60 
What Casarino is suggesting is an inability to link phenomenological time to tangible, 
concrete phenomena in the material world, to draw a substantial connection between - to 
put it a certain way - the subjective experience of time and the objective reality of 
collective action and praxis. He goes to Marx to look for this correlation, and while his 
findings are certainly legitimate (brilliant, even), I think it is still possible to find a 
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comprehensive view within Negri, even if only implicitly. Indeed, our analysis thus far 
has been following a transition from Negri's ontology of immanence to temporality as a 
mode or iteration of immanence, an example of the anti-transcendence so central to 
Negri's entire output. At the same time, our intention has been to come full circle by 
positing praxis - real, corporeal action - as a natural extension of phenomenological time 
and thereby connect with our opening explanation of ontological constructivism. The 
path is straightforward: we move from ontological constructivism (immanence) to 
temporal constructivism (phenomenological time) to corporeal constructivism (praxis). 
With this last transition we will be able to see that Negri has already provided us with the 
tools to marry temporality to corporeality. 
2.7 TIME-AS-PRODUCTION 
In "Kairos, Alma Venus, Multitudo: nine lessons to myself," Negri revives the 
classical term kairos and uses it in both its original manner (to signify qualitative time in 
opposition to chronos, linear/sequential time) and as a term synonymous with the 
abovementioned vocabulary - productive time, constitutive time, and phenomenological 
time. All of these terms essentially represent the same concept; that is, time as a 
qualitative field of immanence, a mode of being that refuses sequence and measure. As 
Casarino puts it: 
For Negri, the temporality of production - that is, the time most expressive of 
our productive and creative energies - is at once a temporality that cannot be 
measured as quantity and yet the temporality that capital endeavors to quantify 
and to measure all the time so as to control it and employ it in the extraction of 
surplus value.61 
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We have already considered the process by which capital imposes geometric structure 
and unity over the heterogeneity of temporal experience. What is important to note is 
that, despite the almost interchangeable nature of these various names, Negri does use 
kairos to represent a specific characteristic of time that may be absent when he employs 
the other terms. Specifically," .. . kairos is the instant, that is to say, the quality of the 
time of the instant, the moment of rupture and opening of temporality. It is the present, 
but a singular and open present.,,62 
Kairos, then, is the here and now, the fissure between past and future that defines 
our moment to moment cognition - a kind of temporal event horizon. While this unique 
characteristic ("being on a razor's edge," "the restlessness of time") certainly sets kairos 
apart, we can see that, as mentioned, it is simultaneously a reiteration of previous 
concepts. In "The Constitution of Time" Negri referred to time as an "envelope" that 
contains our experience of the world. This is certainly the case here, for time is " ... at 
once measure and matter, form and substance.,,63 It is both the context wherein our 
experiences take place (his affinity for certain aspects of Kant's first Critique becomes 
apparent) and the very substance of those experiences. But the reason kairos is 
fundamental for our understanding of constitution and production is that, unlike the other 
terms, the emphasis on the moment, the instant, transitions very smoothly into our 
attempt to fold corporeality into the framework of time itself. This is because Negri 
qualifies this experience not as simply the moment where the present passes over into 
another present and so on ad infinitum; he qualifies the experience as the precise moment 
when being is produced in its various permutations and assemblages, when the actions of 
individuals determine the nature, structure, and texture of reality (the moment is therefore 
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simultaneous with praxis). It is not just the event horizon that absorbs the future into its 
own stream; it is the event horizon that molds and transfigures the entire ontological 
landscape. It is, in the simplest terms, the moment of creation. 
For Negri, this concept of temporality is absolutely fundamental. While its 
importance is certainly an artifact of its relation to production and phenomenological 
experience, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that kairos is the lynchpin or 
centerpiece of Negrian ontology. Indeed, if Descartes' methodological skepticism 
produced the cogito as an Archimedean point, an irrefutable axiom, we can easily draw 
an analogy regarding Negri's use of kairos.64 However, pursuing this analogy, we can 
see that some differences apply, for Negri's understanding of time is even more deep-
seated, more fundamental, than Cartesian subjectivity: 
For subjectivity is not something that subsists: it is - on the contrary - produced 
by kairos, and (as we shall see) depends on the connection of monads of kairos. 
Subjectivity is not before but after kairos. Subjectivity, should one attempt to 
construct it, is not identifiable other than through the path that leads from the 
'here' to the materialist field, and it is precisely on this route that it is 
produced.65 
While Descartes begins with an understanding of the self, an experience of the necessity 
of one's own existence, Negri hinges his entire ontology on the experience ofthe fullness 
of being. As Negri points out, subjectivity, like everything else, is a product of this 
primary and fundamental process. Kairos produces not only the material landscape of 
objects and their relations, but also the subjective landscape in its fullness and totality. In 
I this sense, we can posit kairos as both the centerpiece of Negri's ontological work and 
I 
I, 
~ 
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the full and final articulation of temporality that exists in only embryonic form in The 
Constitution of Time (as constitutive/phenomenological time). 
Furthermore, it is essential to underscore and reiterate the concept's relationship 
with what has been previously termed 'ontological constructivism.' With kairos we find 
the most substantial and developed articulation of the intersection of ontology and praxis: 
"We call this process - that is expression of kairos - 'ontological praxis of truth'. To say 
praxis is to say force that constructs, or transforms the thing into the name and the name 
into the thing.,,66 Here, the simplest act of creation (a linguistic act) is defined, and Negri 
consistently refers to its primacy so as to highlight the importance of his interpretation of 
time. At the temporal event horizon - the very edge of being - the community of 
"monads of kairos,,67 perform the linguistic act of assigning a name to an object, of 
producing a "common name" that accurately reflects its reality. This "adequation of 
name and thing" represents for Negri the construction of communal reality in the form of 
a shared lexicon, an ontological act in the purest form. 
It becomes clear that Negri provides the example of naming to illustrate the 
comprehensive scope of kairos, for the fundamental act of naming is ontologically 
constructive in the same way that the more tangible and noticeable acts of rebellion or 
protesting are. These acts weave new assemblages into the fabric of existence and are 
therefore acts of creation, acts of ontological construction. In the same way that there is 
no "outside" to Empire's process of valorization and accumulation, in phenomenological 
terms there is certainly no "outside" to kairos, no act that does not occur within its 
boundaries (praxis is therefore an act that takes place within the context of kairos). For 
scientific and technological production it is the same: "Sciences and technologies are the 
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tools of kairos, they are born and develop within life and produce the to-come on the 
edge of time.,,68 It is in this way that Negri solves Casarino's problematic of time and 
corporeality. The material world is embedded within time as its product. It is an artifact 
of the "being on the brink" or "being on the razor's edge" that is kairos. 
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3. SUBJECTIVITY 
Solomon's analysis of Hegelian epistemology provided us with another example 
of the form of mediation central to the Hegelian project. To reiterate: the outside world is 
ineffable and elusive unless the subject employs a set of epistemological categories to 
organize empirical data into comprehensible arrangements. There is no irreducible and 
absolutely necessary set of categories, no cognitive filters that are intrinsic to the very 
nature of human consciousness (as we find with Kant). Instead, we find a kind of 
epistemological plasticity in Hegel's assertion that Consciousness generates its own set of 
rules and parameters, its own intemallogic. The result of this ability is that philosophical 
speculation does not find the truth regarding our relationship with the world, but instead 
creates that relationship by providing a set of concepts that act as epistemological rules -
again, we find that " ... knowing and philosophizing about knowing are self-confirming 
. .. ,,69 
actIVItIes. 
As stated before, this VIew represents what can be called a form of 
epistemological constructivism. It is obvious that Hegel is relying on what we termed 
'epistemic mediation'; however, it is equally obvious that his constructivism - whereby 
subjects construct their own cognitive rules by philosophizing - differentiates itself from 
various other forms of idealism. Upon further inspection, we can also see that Hegel's 
constructivism correlates, at least superficially, to the Negrian form of ontological 
constructivism that has been so-far presented as a defining element of Negri's 
revolutionary ontology and the centerpiece of the potential emancipation from the rigid 
structures of Empire and what Negri calls the process of "capitalist structuration." 
57 
At this point clarity is cardinal: in line with previous statements, Hegel's 
philosophy still stands as the chief and central antagonist to the subversive, immanent 
tradition of ontology articulated by Spinoza and rearticulated by Negri. The dialectic is 
still the clearest example of diachronic finalism70 - a forced superimposition of rigidity 
and structure over and above the ontological primacy of collective thought and action. 
Further, the temporality inherent in this overarching system also continues to stand as an 
example of quantitative time, time-as-measure. Casarino definitively makes this case. 
Despite these convictions, it is nonetheless impossible to ignore the fact that Hegel's 
claims carry some ontological weight. Unlike Kant, he refuses to conceal the "real 
world" behind a veil that separates phenomena and noumena, refuses to fall back on the 
empiricist's urge to distinguish between experience as a "mental event" and the external 
object as an objective reality. 
Solomon references this inherent ontology in two passages. First, he refers to the 
fact that many interpreters designate Hegel's epistemology the "ontology of knowledge," 
and second, he makes the interesting statement that, "It is Hegel, before Marx, who 
insists that the point of philosophy is to change the world, although he would add that to 
understand it is to change it.',71 These statements are somewhat elusive, but combined 
with the rest of his analysis, it becomes clear that Hegel's epistemological constructivism 
is not simply an act of constructing a cognitive horizon, but an ontological act of 
constructing a reality. As Consciousness matures, competing epistemological paradigms 
mature along with it. These paradigms do not provide increasingly more precise tool-sets 
that enable the subject to perceive reality; on the contrary, the tool-sets are the entire 
point of the dialectical movement. They are the world that is changing and shifting with 
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the development and maturation of being - this is one of the defining elements of Hegel's 
absolute idealism. 
It becomes apparent, then, that Hegel's epistemology is, according to my 
interpretation of Solomon's analysis, at least superficially parallel to Negri's concept of 
ontological constructivism. Hegel still preoccupies himself with a theory of epistemic 
mediation, and this preoccupation groups him with Kant in regards to transcendence in 
the epistemological context, but it is Hegel's focus on phenomenology, on the analysis of 
Consciousness' experience of the world, that produces a theory of knowledge sharing 
some basic similarities with the Negrian approach. 
The fundamental similarity is that an investigation into the nature of subjectivity 
procures certain facts about the nature of the material world - and vice versa. Solomon's 
work has already made this apparent in the context of Hegel. At the same time, it has 
made it apparent that a better understanding of the political landscape of our 
contemporary age has already been facilitated by our analysis of kairos and its 
constitutive elements. If kairos is defined in part as the moment of creative construction, 
the moment the subject constructs the ontological landscape, then it follows that the 
specific characteristics of kairos - as a precursor to subjectivity - are incorporated into 
the material landscape itself. This parallelism is hardly revolutionary: it simply means 
that the constructive agent imprints the world with certain subjective aspects. It is this 
point - the parallel between subjectivity and corporeality - that can provide an inroad 
into an examination of various political realities and their connection to the above 
discussion. 
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3.2 THE MULTITUDE AND THE HEGEMONY OF IMMATERIAL LABOUR 
Kairos' status as a precursor to subjectivity has been discussed above. In "Kairos, 
Alma Venus, Multitudo," Negri makes it clear that kairos precedes the development of 
subjectivity, and it is therefore misleading to refer to kairos as the home of personality or 
epicenter of feeling and emotion. With this in mind, it is clear that ontological 
constructivism is an act of subjective as well as objective construction, or, to put it 
another way, a creation of various mental and physical assemblages. If this is the case, 
subjectivity is not reducible to a group of universally shared characteristics (as we find in 
the predominant tradition), but instead exists as a shifting set of tendencies and 
potentialities that are constitutive of (and constituted by) the material landscape (again we 
can point to similarities with Hegel's epistemology).72 
It remains to be seen, then, what specific mode of subjectivity is hegemonic in our 
contemporary age. Our analysis has so far drawn a connection between kairos and the 
act of ontological construction, but it has not yet characterized the subjectivity that is a 
product of this process. The term 'multitude' has been used to signify, in straightforward 
fashion, the new political subject under capitalist rule. In reality this is an 
oversimplification - 'multitude' also designates the newly-developed revolutionary 
subjectivity that defines the political and economic realities of life in the age of global 
capitalism. 
In regards to the straightforward definition of the multitude as a political subject, 
Hardt and Negri differentiate between this new subject and various antiquated political 
categories. In the preface for Multitude, for instance, they explain that: 
As a first approach we should distinguish the multitude at a conceptual level 
from other notions of social subjects, such as the people, the masses, and the 
working class. The people has traditionally been a unitary conception. The 
population, of course, is characterized by all kinds of differences, but the people 
reduces that diversity to a unity and makes of the population a single identity: 
'the people' is one. The multitude, in contrast, is manl3 
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This is the central aspect of the authors' new political subject: its irreducibility. Unlike 
previous political categories - categories designed to be unified and subsequently 
"represented" - the multitude is simultaneously unified and disparate, univocal and 
polyvocal. It cannot be simplified as a single, homogenous subject, or overly diversified 
and diffused as a collection of disharmonious and heterogeneous idiosyncrasies. It 
becomes immediately clear that Hardt and Negri are presenting an unconventional 
theory: subjectivity is defined as a fundamentally collective entity, a node within a larger 
matrix or a more substantial and expansive chorus. Also, Negri's remarks concerning a 
community or collective of "monads of kairos" becomes more intelligible: subjectivity is 
not produced autonomously - that is, in seclusion from the outside world and other 
subjects living within it - but rather in concert with these subjects, in a reciprocal 
relationship with their own productive capacities. 
The authors are obviously cognizant of the concept's departure from the Cartesian 
tradition: 
Our point of departure is our recognition that the production of subjectivity and 
the production of the common can together form a spiral, symbiotic 
relationship. Subjectivity, in other words, is produced through cooperation and 
communication and, in tum, this produced subjectivity itself produces new 
forms of cooperation and communication, which III tum produce new 
subjectivity, and so forth.74 
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Indeed, this reciprocal subjectivity could not be further from Descartes and Kant. It is 
possible, however, to point once again to similarities with Hegel's epistemological views 
(the construction of cognitive paradigms that in tum influence the creation of more 
paradigms and so on) and continue to cement his unusual status as both an antagonist (in 
terms of his metaphysical finalism) and a possible progenitor (in terms of his 
phenomenology). Nonetheless, the point remains that what can be called the collectivity 
of the multitude, its communal and reciprocal nature, is another defining element of its 
constitution. 
Lastly, the multitude can be defined in terms of the social know ledges and 
meanings it incorporates, the vast repository of immaterial wealth that is openly shared 
by the cooperation inherent in the multitude's organization. This "innumerable 
multiplicity of powers and social knowledges,,75 is another illustration of the fact that the 
multitude is a cohesive unit capable of producing and sharing information. As a product 
of its collectivity, it constructs a vast reservoir of technico-scientific knowledge made 
available as common goods. As we have seen, Lazzarato defined this knowledge as the 
products of the cooperation between minds, and that is certainly a legitimate definition. 
Other authors utilize Marx's term 'general intellect' to designate this immaterial wealth, 
while still other employ the more recent 'mass intellectuality,' "the collective intelligence 
and accumulated intellectual powers that extend horizontally across society.,,76 
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It is important to note that, whatever term is employed, the concept of immaterial 
goods as a defining characteristic of the multitude leads us back into an analysis of the 
reciprocity between the constructive agent and the material field. To put it another way, 
the multitude's capacity to produce and share constellations of knowledge goes hand in 
hand with the actual existence of immaterial labour as the hegemonic form of production 
in capitalist society. The multitude's formation of a collective subjectivity presents itself 
as the ontological reality that in tum "instructs" the formation of mechanisms of capture 
and control that inevitably contain its revolutionary potential. Thus, mass intellectuality 
is largely put to use in the service of capital, in the service of accumulation and 
exploitation. 
At the same time, it is also true that immaterial labour - the labour that produces 
the cultural, informational aspect of the commodity - provides a kind of revolutionary 
potential that is unique to the "social worker." Again, this potential is a product of the 
multitude's organizational constitution, its inherent capacity to communicate and 
construct. 
3.3 THE GENEALOGY OF REVOLUTION 
Now that we have defined the multitude in terms of its irreducibility, collectivity, 
and mass intellectuality, we can tum to Negri's three phases of capitalist development to 
better understand the position of the multitude within a historical lineage. At the same 
time, this analysis will lead us towards a fuller account of Negri's "constituent republic," 
the conditions required for its formation, and the relationship between this republic and 
the roles of kairos, ontological construction, and the multitude. 
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Negri divides the industrial revolution (and, in general, the overall development 
of capitalism) into three distinct phases. The first phase begins in 1848 with the birth of 
"large-scale industry": " ... the worker is for the first time treated within the command of 
machinery and becomes an appendage of the machinery itself.',n D~spite being 
intricately tied to the factory process, the newly organized "professional worker" has an 
in-depth understanding of the entire productive cycle and is therefore not completely 
alienated from the products of labour. The fact that Negri ties the beginning of this phase 
to the European revolutions of 1848 is a reminder that, once again, the development of 
capitalistic processes is not independent but instead a reactionary subsumption of a 
primary social development. Once again, the economic transformation in the mode of 
production finds its genesis in a thoroughly social phenomenon. 
The second phase of development begins with the Russian revolution of 1917: 
It can be characterized as follows: ... From the point of view of laboring 
processes, there is a new technical composition of the proletariat, and that is a 
type of labor force made completely abstract with respect to the industrial 
activity to which it is attached and, as such, the labor force is reorganized by 
Taylorism. Great masses of workers, who are thus 'dequalified,' are inserted in 
labor processes which are both extremely alienating and complex. The 'mass 
worker' losses the knowledge of the cycle.78 
The mass worker is in this phase alienated from the products of labour to the highest 
degree. The mathematical fascism of the Taylorist model of production strips labour of 
any substance or joy and relegates workers to positions of banality and blind 
subservience. Just as the first phase ends when the mode of production reaches a kind of 
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illogical absurdity (the increasing demand for material goods and employment), the 
period of the mass worker ends in a similar crisis (with the computerization of society 
and corresponding open lines of global communication). 
According to Negri, this crisis ushers in the age of the social worker which starts 
in the years following the Parisian revolution in 1968. The proletariat is no longer forced 
to comply with the increased abstraction of labour; instead, the situation is inverted. The 
social worker is overexposed to the conditions of work and expected to understand all 
facets of the corporate process. Finally, the social worker's labour is increasingly defined 
by the hegemony of immaterial labour, the production of immaterial products, or, more 
precisely, the production of " .. .ideas, symbols, codes, texts, linguistic figures, images, 
and other such products.,,79 It is with this development that the emergence of the 
multitude is confirmed. In Negri's interpretation, 1968 stands as the moment when a set 
of revolutionary potentials and demands for the reconfiguration of labour coalesced into a 
new form of subjectivity. 
As stated, the transition from one developmental phase to the next is characterized 
by a crisis, the point at which the mode of production (capitalism) is incapable of 
managing the forces of production (tools, scientific knowledge etc.). When the former 
becomes an absurdity in the light of the latter, when the logic of capitalism can no longer 
adequately subsume the nuances of the social sphere, a transition into a new phase of 
economic development is imminent. According to Negri, various conditions already 
point to an imminent and inevitable transition - for example, the inability of the 
preexisting theory of value to account for the abolition of the distinction between labour 
time and leisure time. 
65 
In light of Negri's interpretation of history, then, it becomes possible to define the 
multitude as a historical agent demanding transition and change, a revolutionary 
subjectivity revolting against the various absurdities and injustices of our contemporary 
landscape, one dominated by the invasion of capital into every aspect of social life (real 
subsumption). If kairos acts as the centerpiece of Negri's understanding of ontology and 
time, real subsumption stands as the most essential concept in relation to his politics. 
This is not to say that the latter acts, like kairos, as a foundational mode of being and is 
therefore positive and constructive. Instead, real subsumption is the social reality that 
defines our political landscape and cultural horizon. Negri's understanding of the 
political sphere, in this sense, is a product of his understanding of the tendency for 
capitalist processes to expand and appropriate all aspects of life. It is this reality that 
Negri continuously sought to articulate and understand, and because of this it can be seen 
that his other concepts orient around this initial interpretation. 
We have already dealt with this concept in some detail; nevertheless, it will 
perhaps help to reiterate some basic tenets. As Negri repeatedly asserts, there is no 
outside to Empire. This is because Empire, as a new form of polyvocal sovereignty tied 
to capitalist accumulation, expands so as to include within its own structure every aspect 
of social existence. In Mandarini's words: 
Empire operates by folding back over and appropriating the productivity of the 
multitude, 'stripping from the social process of productive cooperation the 
command over its own functioning [ ... ] closing social productive power within 
the griddings ofthe system of Power.' 80 
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It is clear then that the dominating form of capitalism is one defined by expansion and 
appropriation. As explained earlier, Negri posits the ontological force of the multitude 
(potentia) as the antagonist to this form of expansionism and hierarchy (potestas), but we 
can now proceed to analyze in more detail the specific forms these revolutionary 
potentialities can take, and, perhaps more importantly, how they are conditioned or 
determined by the totalizing grasp of real subsumption. 
Throughout Multitude - not to mention their other works - Hardt and Negri 
consistently underscore the fact that, despite their apparent disharmony, contemporary 
resistances are unified in a complex network-structure. In other words, postmodernity 
has witnessed the genesis of a new form of opposition, a form that transcends the two 
varieties of resistance that dominated modernity. The protests and revolts of the 
twentieth century were either a) oriented around a unifYing identity/purpose, or b) 
heterogeneous and disjointed. In the case of the former, the more traditional mode, 
"organization is based on the identity of the struggle, and its unity is organized under 
central leadership, such as the party." Here the examples are numerous, and hardly need 
mentioning. As concerns the latter, revolts largely epitomized by movements concerning 
race, gender, and sexuality, the emphasis is clearly in binary opposition to the traditional 
paradigm: the focus is on independent, self-ruling factions with no central, anchoring 
management. 81 Today's resistances bypass the binary either/or of modernity by being 
simultaneously homogenous and heterogeneous, centered and disconnected, univocal and 
polyvoca1. The authors reference the 200 I revolt in Argentina as an example: it was both 
a product of Argentina's specific history and, in the context of macroeconomics, 
incorporated in the global struggles against " ... the neoliberal policies of the IMF.,,82 In 
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light of this, it can be seen that the postmodern fonn of resistance - the network 
resistance of the multitude - is a product of a new set of social, cultural, political, and 
economic circumstances, and is therefore emblematic of a genealogical transferal, an 
epochal transition that has sent us spiraling into a new era defined in part by a new set of 
potentialities. 
To continue this line of inquiry, it is worthwhile to quote the appearance of a 
similar idea in Empire at length: 
We ought to be able to recognize that this is not the appearance of a new cycle 
of internationalist struggles, but rather the emergence of a new quality of social 
movements. We ought to be able to recognize, in other words, the 
fundamentally new characteristics these struggles all present, despite their 
radical diversity. First, each struggle, though finnly rooted in local conditions, 
leaps immediately to the global level and attacks the imperial constitution in its 
generality. Second, all the struggles destroy the traditional distinction between 
economic and political struggles. The struggles are at once economic, political, 
and cultural - and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles over the fonn 
of life. They are constituent struggles, creating new public spaces and new 
£ f . 83 onns 0 commumty. 
The claim that contemporary rebellions are, no matter what their content, always directed 
towards the same opponent is, at least on a superficial level, highly puzzling. Hardt and 
Negri are essentially claiming that, for example, a student rebellion against tuition fees is 
intricately tied to a feminist protest against abortion legislation. The claim, however, 
gains some legitimacy in the context of real subsumption. If capitalist accumulation has 
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expanded so as to invest itself in all forms and modalities of existence as a negative 
influence, a rebellion against a local issue is simultaneously a rebellion against the global 
issue of capitalist expansion. The student enticed to revolt against tuition fees is 
simultaneously rebelling against the capitalist mechanisms that determine those fees (i.e. 
he is revolting on both the local and global levels). 
As has been shown in the preceding argument, these revolts are at the same time 
the expressions of cooperating modal-points of kairos, or as Negri phrases it, a 
community or society of kairos; that is, individuals involved in the ontologically 
constitutive act of praxis. As stated before, Negri's entire project is a reaffirmation ofthe 
fact that ontology cannot be divorced from social construction and that the fabric of 
reality is produced, not from above, but from the lower depths of social interaction and 
creation. His insistence that the constitution of our ontological horizon is a 
fundamentally social and collective act is the overriding reason that his philosophical and 
political views work in perfect concert and the reason that his analysis of our ontological 
landscape provides the philosophical foundations for an improved political landscape. 
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CONCLUSION: CONSTITUENT REPUBLIC 
By returning to a brief analysis of our contemporary political conditions it is 
hoped that a general picture of Negri's philosophical and political approaches has been 
accurately sketched. As far as a "constituent republic" is concerned, it is understood that 
the preceding work has left the concept ambiguous and unclear. This is a direct result of 
the fact that Negri's project is primarily aimed at, first, the neo-Marxian examination of 
late capitalism's processes and Empire's overall structure, and, second, the theoretical 
establishment of a new political subject. This dual approach is evidenced in a series of 
political and theoretical dichotomies: Empire/multitude, potestas/potentia, 
transcendence/immanence, bourgeoisie/proletariat, capitalism/communism, and so on. 
This is not to say that Negri is a slave to dualistic thinking; in fact, his theoretical work 
successfully deconstructs a number of false dichotomies, such as the mythology of the 
antiquated democracy/communism binary that plagued the era of the Cold War and 
poisoned potential avenues for political discussion and debate. 
What is instead being suggested is that Negri's focus on the conflict between 
ontological immanence and abstract transcendence permeates the entirety of his work. In 
its most general and abstract articulation, this dualism functions as a kind of organizing 
principle, an interpretive tool that can clearly delineate the function and position of his 
core concepts. At the same time, the dualism betrays his Marxist heritage - the exclusive 
focus on proletarian revolt against capitalism and its institutions. More importantly, what 
is certain is that these dualisms, at least on the political level, are capable of being 
deconstructed in the act of revolution against the side of Power or potestas. It is this 
potential for revolt and subsequent freedom that lends the project of neo-Marxism and 
70 
other political alternatives (for in Negri's mind, they are linked) an air of urgency and 
resolve that is lacking in other philosophical pursuits. 
To return to the concept of a constituent republic, to the hypothetical future of 
post-capitalism, although Negri only provides the possible conditions for this transition 
instead of the actual political constitution itself, we are nonetheless provided with some 
relatively vital information in "Constituent Republic." First, Negri defines the 
constitution passed down by our ancestors: "To be specific, since the 1930s, in the 
countries of the capitalist West, there has begun to develop a constitutional system that 
we would call the 'Fordist' constitution, or the laborist Welfare State constitution."s4 
This agreement was based on an understanding between the working class (seeking a 
welfare system) and the "national bourgeoisie" (seeking workers and, more generally, 
industrial progress). In other words, the constitution is based on a "contract" between the 
owners of the means of production and the workers who employ those means of 
production on a daily basis. In line with the increasing demands of the capitalist system 
and the developing requirements of the worker, the constitution went into crisis 
(according to Negri, it becomes problematized in 1968). 
In his words: 
The juridico-constitutional system based on the Fordist compromIse, 
strengthened by the constituent agreement between the national bourgeoisie and 
the industrial working class, and overdetermined by the conflict between the 
Soviet and U.S. superpowers (symbolic representations of the two conflicting 
parties on the stage of each individual nation) has thus run out its time.85 
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This, then, is the state of our modem constitution - it exists as an outmoded 
representation of a previous era. The beginnings of a new republic will therefore have to 
be inaugurated by the formulation of a new constitution that represents the realities of 
modem production and the social relationships that are intrinsic to this mode. 
Negri goes on to explicate the characteristics of the "new proletariat," a task that 
he and various associated authors have pursued since their time in Italy. According to 
Negri, "The political task of arriving at a definition of the post-Fordist proletariat is by 
now well advanced. This proletariat embodies a substantial section of the working class 
that has been restructured within processes of production that are automated and 
computer controlled."s6 His point is that the social reality of immaterial labour demands 
a reevaluation of Marx's limited category proletariat. It must be expanded, in other 
words, to include everyone struggling under the hegemony of capitalist rule, everyone 
engaged in the act of self-valorization and ontological construction. This is just one 
example of Negri's attempt to "modernize" Marx. Indeed, the latter does come equipped 
with a plethora of pejorative baggage, some of which is deserved (the position's obvious 
Eurocentricism) and some which is not (the ignorance and conceptual confusion linking it 
to, for example, National Socialism). Needless to say, one of Negri's primary tasks is to 
reinterpret and reformulate Marxist theory and make it compatible with modernity, make 
it capable of confronting the reality of global capitalism. Whether he has been successful 
- or whether this task is even achievable at all - is a difficult question. 
Negri's conclusion in "Constituent Republic" is that the ideal society must 
paradoxically avoid a fmalized constitution altogether. It must pursue the ideal of 
continual constitutional reproduction: 
The constitutional paradox of the constituent Republic consists in the fact that 
the constituent process never closes, that the revolution does not come to an 
end, that constitutional law and ordinary law refer back to one single source and 
are developed unitarily within a single democratic procedure.87 
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Indeed, a future republic will have to be founded on the creative tendencies of the 
multitude, on its network formation, reciprocity, and mass intellectuality. At the same 
time, contemporary revolts (and, in general, disillusionment) point to the demand for a 
political system free from transcendent hierarchy, free from the hollow abstractions of 
capitalist accumulation and the parasitical nature of Empire. A post-Fordist constitution 
will have to be based on these fundamental insights. 
Negri provides a conceptual toolbox capable of pushing for this political 
transformation, a set of theoretical positions that consistently emphasize the primacy of 
the political subject over and above the various forms of political and philosophical 
finalism that have dominated much of Western though since Plato. As explained above, 
varieties of philosophical transcendence take one of two forms: either a version of 
epistemic mediation that abolishes the immediacy of the subject's relationship with the 
world (as we see most obviously in Kant) or a version of metaphysical transcendence that 
superimposes an abstract schema over the material world, relegating the latter to a 
position of lesser ontological status (as we see most obviously in Plato and Hegel). 
Negri's central concept of ontological constructivism provides an alternative model that 
escapes the pitfalls of hierarchy and abstraction. Here, reality is not constructed from 
above but from below; it is constructed by the collective action of subjects engaged in the 
struggle for autonomy and self-valorization. 
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This is absolutely central to Negri's work - revolution and insurrection are the 
purest instances of the formulation of subjectivity. As Negri puts it, " ... the 
deconstruction of value is the matrix of subjectivity."gg The critique of Power and its 
hollow logic is simultaneously the construction of an antagonistic subjectivity that finds 
its revolutionary potential in the process of labour itself. This was one of Marx's keenest 
insights - that "living labour" resides in the heart of the capitalist monopoly as the 
epicenter of community, innovation, and entrepreneurial insight, that this labour is an 
independent, autonomous force capable of achieving true freedom and true democracy. 
Negri has also shown that the irreducible unit of kairos - as the moment of 
creative construction and the foundation of subjectivity - refuses the structuralism of 
quantitative time as both an economic theory of value and a purely philosophical 
position. Instead, the temporal horizon or Umwelt is advanced as the phenomenological 
alternative to the various attempts at understanding temporality according to linear, 
mathematical models. 
These three concepts - kairos, ontological constructivism, and multitude - are the 
defining elements of Negri's ontology and the very core of his political approach. As 
explained at the outset, they connect praxis and ontology in a manner that renders the 
conventional distinction between theory and practice unintelligible. 
Hardt defines self-valorization as, 
... an alternative social structure of value that is founded not on the production 
of surplus value but on the collective needs and desires of the producing 
community ... Self-valorization is also conceived in a more philosophical 
framework as the social processes that constitute an alternative and autonomous 
collective subjectivity within and against capitalist society.89 
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As epitomized in this definition, the concept of self-valorization, a concept that was 
integral to the Italian intellectual movements of the sixties and seventies, encompasses 
the entirety of not only Negri's pursuits but the resistances and revolutions of a wide 
range of academic and non-academic struggles against the mode of capitalist valorization. 
In fact, to position oneself against capitalism at all is to contribute in some way to the 
process of constructing alternative social forms and structures that damage the integrity 
of capital itself. As social development pushes forward, it is entirely likely that we will 
witness a rupture in the system of totalizing control as it reaches its limit and is incapable 
of folding back, in a retrospective fashion, onto the ontologically primary constructions 
and arrangements of the multitude. Marx believed he would witness this crisis - he was, 
of course, wrong. But Marx was mistaking infantile capitalism for a form of mature, 
developed capitalism. Our version of global or late capitalism may not be the end of the 
system, but it surely represents a fully developed phase of the mode of production. 
Again, real subsumption renders almost any resistance a resistance against 
capitalism. If capitalism has invaded all aspect of the social sphere, then a rebellion 
against any part of life is a rebellion, at least in part, against capitalist processes. In "A 
Resistance Role for Marxism in the Belly of the Beast," Maivan Clech Lam comes to a 
similar conclusion concerning the seeming disharmony and irreconcilability of our 
revolutionary pursuits: 
By now, however, we are all entrapped by the single world-system, variously 
called late, global, or global industrial capitalism. Our critiques of it therefore 
spnng necessarily from a place of contamination and at least partial 
accommodation. Nevertheless, all of the entrapped became so via different 
histories, subsist in different compartments of the belly, and have different 
knowledges of the tormentor which, if pooled, could enhance their ability to so 
irritate the beast as to hopefully make it cough them up and expire. 90 
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The universality of our contemporary dilemma, the fact that the entire social sphere exists 
in the belly of the beast, renders our efforts necessary and connected. The network 
structure of the multitude (described above) also suggests that a kind of subjective 
interconnectedness is rendering our political conflicts increasingly universal: if the 
individual subject is determined in part by the subjectivities surrounding him, if his 
nature is defined communally (as it is with the multitude), then perhaps we are witnessing 
the genesis of a new kind of struggle. This will not make the struggle any easier to 
contest. Above all else, these dilemmas perhaps necessitate the continued pursuit of 
philosophical trajectories that oppose themselves to transcendence in its various forms. 
In the context of this project it has only been possible to compare Negri's 
approach with a small number of oppositional theories, thereby gaining some insight into 
the conflict and antagonism at the heart of Negri's output. What has been excluded with 
this choice is the more constructive act of tracing a philosophical lineage of historical 
perspectives that exist within what can be called the 'subversive' tradition of ontology, 
metaphysics, and epistemology. Of course, Negri's debt to Spinoza is impossible to 
ignore, but there are clear similarities with (to name a few) Epicurus, Machiavelli, and 
Heidegger, and the project of clearly tracing lines of influence and correspondence would 
be anything but superfluous. Indeed, in the face of the predominance of the established, 
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canonical traditions in philosophy (some of which have been outlined here) the 
exploration of an alternative philosophical history would be of great value. 
At the same time, an attempt to put some of Negri's concepts to practical use in 
the political sphere could provide interesting results. More specifically, pointing in the 
direction of an effective critique of a capitalistic institution like the IMF is increasingly 
plausible, at least from the Negrian standpoint. Indeed, it is possible to trace the outlines 
of such a critique from the analysis thus far. There are two central aspects of this outline: 
a) the IMF (or any other supranational economic institution) is an economic organization 
operating according to a top-down model transcendent in nature. Its mandate since its 
inauguration at Bretton Woods has been to impose an alien economic logic (largely in the 
form of neo-liberal privatization) on economies lagging behind the global tendency 
towards a supranational market. This attempt at transcendent operation, like the 
corporations that operate the same way, runs contrary to the primacy of the multitude's 
constitutive, biopolitical production. Lastly, b) privatization itself violates - in a very 
direct way - the nature of common goods and immaterial labour. Therefore, institutions 
that advocate such an agenda are ignoring the genealogical shift that has made 
cooperative, immaterial labour the new hegemonic form of production. Unfortunately, 
this is only the brief framework of a critique-in-progress, but its potential effectiveness is 
strongly aided by the philosophical underpinnings provided by Negri's immanent 
ontology. 
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